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THE VALUATION OF AN EDUCATIONAL
DEGREE AT DIVORCE
Linda Susan Mullenix*
I. INTRODUCTION
In June, 1982, a New York state trial court held that a physician's
license to practice medicine was marital property subject to equitable
division at divorce and awarded the wife forty percent of the value of
the husband's medical degree. The court found the wife's contribution
to the marriage amounted to $103,390 and that the husband's degree
was worth $472,000, given his age and what he could be expected to
earn in comparison with a college graduate without a medical degree.
Based on these findings, the court awarded the wife $188,800 as her
property share of her husband's degree.' Within a month, a New York
appellate court in another case held that a professional education or
license did not fall within traditional concepts of property and that
"gross inequities may result from predicating distribution awards upon
the speculative expectation of enhanced future earnings."2 In January,
1982, a California court of appeal held that where the community had
not previously benefited from the increased value of an educational de-
gree or license to practice, the community possessed an interest in that
increase in value.' But only eight months later, on rehearing before the
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This article was prepared with the research assistance of Diane Carpenter, Michael
Lebovitz, and Marc Ward, second year students at Loyola of Los Angeles Law School.
1. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d 233, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1982). During their nine-
year marriage, Mrs. O'Brien was employed as a grammar school teacher and her entire
earnings went for the joint support of the couple. The husband attended college and medi-
cal school and completed an internship during this period. The O'Briens did not accumulate
any substantial assets while they were married and the court concluded that "the only valua-
ble surviving asset acquired by either spouse during their nine-year marriage is the profes-
sional license of the plaintiff." Id at 236, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 803.
2. Lesman v. Lesman, 88 A.D.2d 153, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1982), affig 110 Misc. 2d 815,
442 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1981). In Lesman, the court held that a medical license to practice is not
property for the purpose of equitable distribution of marital property under New York's
Domestic Relations Law. The court based its conclusion, in part, on its finding that the
supporting spouse had not played a significant monetary role in the medical education of the
husband. See N.Y. DOM. REL. L. § 236 B (McKinney 1982).
3. In re Marriage of Sullivan, 127 Cal. App. 3d 656, mod#Fed, 134 Cal. App. 3d 634,
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same panel of judges, the court seemingly reversed itself, stating:
"Upon further reflection, we have recognized that the starting premise
for the holding previously reached is wrong."4 The court then held that
a professional education acquired during the course of a marriage is
neither community nor separate property, since the education does not
possess the attributes of property.5
These cases illustrate the doctrinal chaos in a rapidly developing
area of the law - the situation where one spouse supports the other
through college, graduate school, or professional school, only to dis-
cover that the marriage has failed.' In recent months a number of
184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1982). The Sullivans were married for ten years, during which Mrs.
Sullivan worked both part-time and full-time as an accountant and a budget analyst. Her
husband finished his undergraduate work, attended medical school, and completed ad-
vanced training as a urologist. The court found that Mrs. Sullivan was the main support of
the community for much of the marriage. At the time of the divorce, the Sullivans had very
few assets - some used furniture and two automobiles that were not completely paid for.
Under these circumstances the court held that where the community has not previously
benefited from the increased value of an educational degree or license to practice, the com-
munity possesses apro tanto interest in the increase in value during the marriage. Id at 680.
4. In re Marriage of Sullivan, 134 Cal. App. 3d 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1982). On
rehearing the Sullivan panel was disturbed by possible inaccuracies in the trial court record,
noting that "there was not one shred of evidence before the trial court to demonstrate that
this case was one where the wife had 'put hubbie through' as was widely represented in the
media." The court indicated that notwithstanding the fact that its prior decision was based
on a "largely hypothesized" case, this problem was of no consequence since the court was
reversing itself on other grounds. Id at 641, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
5. Id at 642, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
6. Although there has been a growing trend in the last two years to recompense the
working spouse for that spouse's contributions to the other's education, the basic issues in-
volved and their resolution are hardly new. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal.
App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979), disapproved on other grounds in In re Marriage of
Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980); Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App.
2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969); In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75
(1978); Greer v. Greer, 32 Colo. App. 196, 510 P.2d 905 (1973); Lockwood v. Lockwood, 354
So. 2d 1267 (Fla. Ct. App. 1978); McAllister v. McAllister, 345 So. 2d 352 (Fla. Ct. App.
1977); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 173 Ind. App. 661,365 N.E.2d 792 (1977); In re Marriage of Horst-
mann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich. App. 693, 264 N.W.2d 97
(1978); In re Marriage of Vanet, 544 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Wheeler v. Wheeler,
193 Neb. 615, 228 N.W.2d 594 (1975); Magruder v. Magruder, 190 Neb. 573, 209 N.W.2d
585 (1973); Prosser v. Prosser, 156 Neb. 629, 57 N.W.2d 173 (1953); Stem v. Stem, 66 N.J.
340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975); Muckleroy v. Muckleroy, 84 N.M. 14, 498 P.2d 1357 (1972); Mor-
gan v. Morgan, 52 A.D. 2d 804, 383 N.Y.S.2d 343 (1976), modifying 81 Misc. 2d 616, 366
N.Y.S.2d 977 (1975); Daniels v. Daniels, 185 N.E.2d 773 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961); Hubbard v.
Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979); Shaan v. Shahan, 1 FAM. L. RvrR. 2802 (Okla. Ct.
App. Ist Div. Sept. 9, 1975 unpublished opinion); Diment v. Diment, 531 P.2d 1071 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1975); Wallahan v. Wallahan, 284 N.W.2d 21 (S.D. 1979); Childers v. Childers, 15
Wash. App. 792, 552 P.2d 83 (1976), modNed, 89 Wash. 2d 592, 575 P.2d 201 (1978); Parsons
v. Parsons, 68 Wis. 2d 744, 229 N.W.2d 629 (1975); Shetney v. Shetney, 49 Wis. 2d 26, 181
N.W.2d 516 (1970).
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states have decided cases of first impression in which one spouse has
asked the court to consider the other spouse's educational degree a
marital property asset to be distributed along with the couple's other
accumulated property.7 More often than not, in short duration mar-
7. No reported case has involved a husband who asked the court for some recompense
for his support or contributions to a wife's pursuit of an educational degree. In all cases
discussed in this article, the wife contributed financially and otherwise while the husband
attended school. As more women enter the work force and pursue professional careers, the
typical "wife-supports-husband-through-school" syndrome will change. The analysis and
proposed remedies in this article are intended to apply regardless of the gender of the sup-
porting spouse.
Recent cases of first impression dealing with the issue of compensation for contributions
to a spouse's educational degree are Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (Ct. App.
1981); Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); In re Marriage of DeLa Rosa,
309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981); In re Marriage of Cropp, 5 FAm. L. RPTR. 2957 (Minn. Dist.
Ct. Sept. 6, 1979); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 175 N.J. Super. 443, 419 A.2d 1149 (1980), rev'd,
182 N.J. Super. 598, 442 A.2d 1062 (1982); Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1981);
DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44,296 N.W. 2d 761 (Wis. 1980). Other recent cases, although
not cases of first impression, are In re Marriage of Sullivan, 127 Cal. App. 3d 656 (1982),
modfed, 134 Cal. App. 3d 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1982); In re Marriage of McManama,
399 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 1980); Leveck v. Leveck, 614 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Reen v.
Reen, 8 FAM. L. RPTR. 1053, 2193 (Mass. P. and Fain. Ct., Dec. 23, 1981); Vaclav v. Vaclav,
96 Mich. App. 584, 293 N.W.2d 613 (1980); Lowrey v. Lowrey, 633 S.W.2d 157 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1982); Lynn v. Lynn, 7 FAM. L. RmR. 3001 (N.J. Super. Ct. Dec. 5, 1980); Lesman v.
Lesman, 88 A.D.2d 153, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1982), modifying, 110 Misc. 2d 815,442 N.Y.S.2d
955 (1981); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d 233, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1982); Church v.
Church, 96 N.M. 388, 630 P.2d 1243 (Ct. App. 1981) (applying Virginia law); Lira v. Lira, 68
Ohio App. 2d 164, 428 N.E.2d 445 (1980); In re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318
N.W.2d 918 (1982); and Roberto v. Brown, 107 Wis. 2d 17, 318 N.W.2d 358 (1982).
These cases have generated a good deal of commentary. See, e.g., Brigner, I Put Him
Through School... Now He Says We're Finished, 4 FAM. ADVOC. 16 (1982) [hereinafter
Brigner, I Put Him Through School]; Castleberry, Constitutional Limitations on the Division
of Property Upon Divorce, 10 ST. MARY L. J. 37 (1978) [hereinafter Castleberry, Division of
Property Upon Divorce]; Chastain, Henry, and Woodside, Determination of Property Rights
Upon Divorce in South Carolina" An Exploration and Recommendation, 33 S.C.L. REv. 227
(1981); Erickson, Spousal Support Towardthe Realization ofEducational Goals: How the Law
Can Ensure Reciprocity, 1978 Wis. L" Rnv. 947 [hereinafter Erickson, Spousal Support];
Greene, Dissolution of/the "Educational Partnership" Marriage: Professional Degrees as Di-
visible Marital Property, 55 FLA. BAR J. No. 4 (April 1981) [hereinafter Greene, Dissolution
of the "Educational Partnership" Marriage]; Kenderdine, Contributions to Spouse's Educa-
tio The Search for Compensation when the Marriage Ends, 5 OKLA. CITY L. REV. 409
(1980) [hereinafter Kenderdine, Contributions to Spouse's Education]; Kennedy and Thomas,
Putting a Value On: Education and Professional Goodwill, 2 FAM. ADVOc. 3 (1979); Kiker,
Divorce Litigation: Valuing the Spouses' Contributions to the Marriage, 16 TRIAL No. 12
(p.48) (December 1980) [hereinafter Kiker, Valuing Spouse's Contributions]; Krauskopf, Rec-
ompense for Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in
Human Capital, 28 UNIv. KAN. L. REv. 379 (1980) [hereinafter Krauskopf, Recompensefor
Financing Spouse's Education]; Mazanec, 4 Degree or License as Marital Property. The In-
man Case, 46 KENTUCKY BENCH AND BAR 18 (1982) [hereinafter Mazanec, The Inman
Case]; Prager, Sharing Princies and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1 (1977); The Research Group, Equitable Distribution in Virginia: An Overview of the
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riages, there is little or no other property for the court to distribute.
New Statute, 31 VA. BAR NEWS 47 (August 1982); Schaefer, Wife Works So Husband Can
Go to Law School- Should She Be Taken in as a "Partner" When "'Esq. " Is Followed by
Divorce? or Can You Have a Community Property Interest in a Professional Education? 2
COMM. PROP. J. 85 (1975) [hereinafter Schaefer, Community Property Interest in Professional
Education]; Younger, Is Marriage an Economic Partnershp?, 83 CASE & COM. No. 5 (Sept.-
Oct. 1978). See also Annot., Spouse's Professional Degree or License as Marital Propertyfor
Purposes of41imony, Support, or Property Settlement, 4 A.L.R. 4th 1294 (1981); Note, In Re
Marriage of Graham: Education Acquired During Marriage -for Richer or Poorer?, 12 J.
MAR. L. REV. 709 (1979); Comment, Rehabilitative Spousal Support: In Need of a More
Comprehensive Approach to Mitigating Dissolution Trauma, 12 U.S.F. L. REv. 493 (1978);
Comment, The Interest of the Community in a Professional Education, 10 CAL. W.L. REV.
590 (1974); Note, A Property Theory ofFuture Earning Potential in Dissolution Proceedings,
56 WASH. L. REV. 277 (1981); Best (Thankless) Performance in a Supporting Role, 8 STU-
DENT LAWYER No. 5 (p.51) (1980); Note, Graduate Degree RejectedAs Marital Properly Sub.
ject to Division Upon Divorce: In Re Marriage of Graham, 11 CONN. L. REV. 62 (1978);
Note, Horstmann v. Horstmann: Present Right to Practice a Profession as Marital Property,
56 DENVER L.J. 677 (1979); Note, Intangible Education and Professional Attainments as Divis-
ible Marital Property: Inman v. Inman, 7 NORTHERN Ky. L. REV. 145 (1980); Comment,
Professional Education as a Divisible Asset in Marriage Dissolutions, 64 IOWA L. REv. 705
(1979); Note, Domestic Relations: Recognition of Wfe's Interest in Professional Degree Earned
by Husband During Marriage - Hubbard v. Hubbard, 7 U. DAYTON L. REV. 183 (1981)
[hereinafter Domestic Relations: Recognition of W/fe's Interest]; Recent Cases, Divorce After
Professional School Education And Future Earning Capacity May Be Marital Property: In
Re Marriage of Horstmann, 44 Mo. L. REV. 329 (1979) [hereinafter Recent Cases, Divorce
After Professional School]; Recent Development, Divorce - The Effect of a Spouse's Profes.
sional Degree on a Division of Marital Property and Award of 41imony. Hubbard v. Hub-
bard, 15 TULSA L. J. 378 (1979); Recent Development, Educational Degree Does Not
Constitute Marital Property Subject to Division Between Spouses Upon Divorce. Graham v.
Graham, 13 TULSA L. J. 646 (1978).
The press also has reported or commented on some of these recent cases. See Allen,
Court Recognizes Marital "Interest'in Medical License, L.A. Daily J., January 13,'1982, at 1;
Arnold, Divorcee Entitled To Share Doctor's Future Earnings, L.A. Times, January 12, 1982,
at 1, col. 6, 7; Granelli, Whose Law Degree Is It, Anyway, National L.J., February 1, 1982,
at 6, col. 2; Ruffra, Include Education In MaritalAssets, StudyAdvocates, L.A. Daily J., June
7, 1982, at 1, col. 4; Sullivan, Divorce, American Style, Is Killing Me By Degrees, L.A. Times,
January 19, 1982, at Part II, 5, col. 1-2; Unchartered Areas of Alimony - M.D. License.-
Divorce Asset, National L.J., December 22, 1980, at 20, col. 3; Doctor Ordered To Share
Value f MD. Degree with Ex-Wfe, L.A. Daily J., December 11, 1980, at 2, col. 4.
8. See, e.g., Inre Marriage of Sullivan, 127 Cal. App. 3d 656, 661 (1982), modF/fed, 134
Cal. App. 3d 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1982); In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 431,
574 P.2d 75, 76 (1978); In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 887 (Iowa 1978);
Reen v. Reen, 8 FAM. L. Rim. 1053 (Mass. P. and Fain. Ct., Dec. 23, 1981); Moss v. Moss,
80 Mich. App. 693, 695, 264 N.W.2d 97, 98 (1978); In re Marriage of Cropp, 5 FAM. L.
RPTR. 2957 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Sept. 6, 1979); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 175 N.J. Super. 443, 445,
419 A.2d 1149, 1150 (1980), rev'd, 182 N.J. Super. 598, 442 A.2d 1062 (1982); Morgan v.
Morgan, 366 N.Y.S.2d 977, 979, 81 Misc. 2d 616, 618 (1975), modfed, 52 A.D.2d 804, 383
N.Y.S. 2d 343 (1976); Daniels v. Daniels, 185 N.E.2d 773, 774 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961); Hub-
bard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 751 (1979); Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656, 658 (1981);
In re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 4, 7, 318 N.W.2d 918, 920, 923 (1982).
Even in long duration marriages there may be few or no assets available for distribu-
tion, because the divorcing couple may be on the brink of bankruptcy. See Inman v. Inman,
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Also, the statutory schemes of some states entangle many supporting
spouses in a peculiar legal "Catch-22": Supporting spouses are barred
from receiving maintenance or alimony precisely because they have
proven themselves capable of self support.'
578 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Diment v. Diment, 531 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1975).
For a thorough discussion of divorce awards in relation to the duration of the marriage,
see generally Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of
Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 U.C.L.A. L. Rnv. 1181 (1981)[hereinafter
Weitzman, The Economics ofDivorce]. Weitzman's study, which analyzed a statistical sam-
ple of divorce decrees in California, concluded that "[t]he first and perhaps most important
fact that this research reveals about marital property is that many divorcing couples have
little or no property to divide." Id at 1188.
In addition, the problem of the divisibility of an educational degree has also developed
in the context of unmarried couples who cohabitate during the period the degree is acquired.
See In re Marriage of Goldstein, 97 IM. App. 3d 1023, 423 N.E.2d 1201 (1981); Hewitt v.
Hewitt, 62 II. App. 3d 861, 380 N.E.2d 454 (1978), rev'd, 77 IM. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204
(1979). For a discussion of the relationship between developing cohabitation law and prop-
erty interests, see Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1125, 1159-70 (1981) [hereinafter Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Mar-
riage]. For a state-by-state analysis of the rights of nonmarital partners, see generally Freed
and Foster, Divorce in the Ftty States: An Overview, 14 FAM. L. Q. 229, 276-83 (1981) [here-
inafter Divorce in the Ffty States].
9. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Sullivan, 127 Cal. App. 3d 656, 663, modefed, 134 Cal.
App. 3d 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1982); In re Marriage of McManama, 399 N.E.2d 371, 373
(Ind. 1980); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 173 Ind. App. 661, 665, 365 N.E.2d 792, 795-96 (1977); In re
Marriage of DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 757 (Minn. 1981). The Minnesota statute gov-
erning the award of maintenance is typical of the kind of statute that restricts many judges
from awarding an able-bodied, employed spouse some form of maintenance. The statute
provides that a spouse who seeks maintenance must meet two conditions. The spouse must
both:
(a) [Lack] sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to him, to
provide for his reasonable needs, especially during a period of training or educa-
tion, and (b) [be] unable to adequately support himself after considering all rele-
vant circumstances through appropriate employment or [be] the custodian of a
child whose condition or circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not
be required to seek employment outside the home.
Minn. Stat. 518.552 (1980); cf. In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429,433, 574 P.2d 75, 78
(1978) (restrictive maintenance statute; wife requested no maintenance).
Professor Weitzman's study of divorced couples concluded that a small minority of
divorced women actually receive spousal support. "The relatively low proportion of support
awards suggests two conclusions. . . first, an expectation of self-sufficiency for most di-
vorced women - and for virtually all of those married for less than fifteen years - and
second, a significant gap between the reality of support awards and the law's stated intent to
provide transitional support and support for women with impaired earning capacities."
Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce, supra note 8, at 1222-23. But see In re Marriage of
Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982); Roberto v. Brown, 107 Wis. 2d 17, 318
N.W.2d 358 (1982) (more liberal approaches to construing maintenance statutes). The court
in Lundberg, for example, ruled that under Wisconsin's maintenance statute, "maintenance
payments are no longer limited to situations where the spouse is incapable of self-support.
Instead, we view maintenance as a flexible tool available to the trial court to ensure a fair
and equitable determination in each individual case." In re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis.
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That courts have been perplexed and troubled by these cases is
evident from the language of their decisions. Some judges have likened
marriage to a partnership or to a joint venture. 10 Similarly, many
courts have described an "investment" theory of marriage in which the
supporting spouse invests time and money in the student spouse, with
the expectation of a financial return when the student spouse becomes a
professionial practitioner." A variation on this theme is the agricul-
2d 1, 12, 318 N.W.2d 918, 923 (1982). At least one court has awarded maintenance to a
supporting spouse to enable her to complete her own graduate education after divorce. See
Mori v. Mori, 124 Ariz. 193, 196, 603 P.2d 85, 88 (1979) (wife entitled to minimum of three
years rehabilitative maintenance to complete education after twenty-five year marriage to
lawyer).
10. "This... becoming a lawyer through the efforts of both the parties is similar to the
building of a business through the joint efforts of both parties that has good potential for the
future. It is an asset of the marriage to be considered in the property division." In re Mar-
riage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 887 (1978); cf. DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 57,
296 N.W.2d 761, 767 (1980). In DeWitt, the court, commenting on the "cost approach"
remedies of Horstmann and Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979), says: "It
treats the parties as though they were strictly business partners, one of whom has made a
calculated investment in the commodity of the other's professional training, expecting a dol-
lar for dollar return. We do not think that most marital planning is so coldly undertaken."
98 Wis. 2d at 57, 296 N.W.2d at 767. For an economic analysis of the family as a business
firm, see generally, Krauskopf, Recompensefor Financing Spouse's Education, supra note 7,
at 386-88. See also Greene, Dissolution of the "Educational Partnershp" Marriage, supra
note 7, at 292-93 ("Regardless of the cause, however, the dissolution of such a marriage can
be likened to a dissolution of a partnership in which one partner retires and the other carries
on. The professional degree and license to practice should be considered an asset obtained
by the partnership and, perhaps, because of the partnership .... ").
Some commentators have been critical of this notion that marriage resembles an eco-
nomic partnership. See, e.g., Younger, Is Marriage.4n Economic Partnershho, supra note 7,
at 3. Younger points out that the characteristics of a partnership are equal rights to manage
and possess property; the right to share in partnership profits, surpluses, and losses; and on
dissolution, the right of each partner to a return of his contribution. In most states, however,
"partnership" roles in marriage are sex-defined, with the husband as the financial provider
and the wife economically dependent. In many jurisdictions the husband is liable for his
wife's support, while the wife is liable for her husband only if he is incapable of supporting
himself. While a wife can sue for separation for a husband's failure of support, there is no
reciprocal right for the husband. Only wives, usually, can hope for attorneys' fees in a di-
vorce action. Finally a wife's misconduct (such as adultery) may bar her from alimony in
some states. Id
11. A typical statement of the "investment" theory of marriage can be found in Wisner
v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 341, 631 P.2d 115, 123 (Ct. App. 1981) where the court observed
that when a divorce follows soon after the completion of an educational degree, "the spouse
who has devoted much of the product of several years of labor to an 'investment' in future
family prosperity is barred from any return on his or her investment, while the other spouse
has received a windfall of increased earning capacity." See also In re Marriage of Graham,
194 Colo. 429, 434, 574 P.2d 75, 78 (1978) (Carrigan, J., dissenting) ("Her earnings not only
provided her husband's support but also were 'invested' in his education. . ."); Inman v.
Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) ("Thus the spouse who has devoted much
of the product of several years of labor to an 'investment' in future family prosperity is
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tural analogy, where the laboring wife diligently helps her farmer hus-
band to sow the seeds, but is not around when the crop is harvested and
the fruits of their labors are reaped.
1 2
The decisions are also filled with the language of equity, justice,
and fairness.1 3 In an often quoted dissent, a Colorado Supreme Court
justice argued that where a wife had sacrificed to support her husband
through school, only to be divorced shortly after he had completed his
degree, "equity demands that courts seek extraordinary remedies to
prevent extraordinary injustice." 4 In analyzing the so-called "educa-
tional degree/professional license syndrome,"' 5 many judges have con-
cluded that it is patently unfair to allow one spouse to be the
barred from any return on his investment"); Lowrey v. Lowrey, 633 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1982) ("[t]hat entitlement in some respects is tied to I suppose a theory of recoup-
ment concerning the investment that she made from her earnings towards the respondent")
(statement of trial court judge); Prosser v. Prosser, 156 Neb. 629, 632, 57 N.W.2d 173, 175
(1953); Magruder v. Magruder, 190 Neb. 573, 577, 209 N.W.2d 585, 588 (1973); Hubbard v.
Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 750 (Okla. 1979); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 175 N.J. Super. 443, 446,
419 A.2d 1149, 1150 (1980), rev'd, 182 N.J. Super. 598, 442 A.2d 1062, 1066-67 (1982); In re
Marriage of DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Minn. 1981); ef DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis.
2d 44, 57, 296 N.W.2d 761, 767 (1980) (marriage not strictly a business partnership where
one spouse makes a calculated investment in the commodity of the other's professional
training). For an extensive discussion of the theory of "investment in human capital," see
generally Krauskopf, Recompense For Financing Spouse's Education, supra note 7, at 381-88.
12. See, e.g., Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich. App. 693, 694, 264 N.W.2d 97, 98 (1978) ("This
case presents the not uncommon situation of a wife who, having worked so that her husband
could obtain a professional education, finds herself left by the roadside before the fruits of
that education can be harvested."). One commentator, critical of the growing trend to award
the wife some interest in the husband's future professional career, noted: "However, when
faced with the short term 'educational partnership' marriage, the theory of these courts
seems to be that because the 'fruits' of the crop seeded by the wife did not fully develop
during coverture, she should be awarded a portion of all later harvests, regardless that she
will not be involved in future cultivation of the field." Greene, Dissolution of the "Educa-
tional Partnership" Marriage, supra note 7, at 296.
13. A typical description of the educational degree case is provided in Hubbard v. Hub-
bard, 603 P.2d 747, 750 (Okla. 1979): "[Tlhis case presents broad questions of equity and
natural justice which cannot be avoided on. . .narrow grounds." For similar invocations
of equity, justice, and fairness, see In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 78 (Colo. 1978)
(Carrigan, J., dissenting); Lockwood v. Lockwood, 354 So. 2d 1267, 1269 (Fla. 1978); In re
Marriage of McManama, 399 N.E.2d 371, 375 (Ind. 1980) (Hunter, J., dissenting); Inman v.
Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Prosser v. Prosser, 156 Neb. 629, 634, 57
N.W.2d 173, 176 (1953); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 175 N.J. Super. 443, 446, 419 A.2d 1149,
1150 (1980), rev'd, 182 N.J. Super. 598, 442 A.2d 1062 (1982); In re Cropp, 5 FAM. L. RirR.
2957, 2958 (D. Minn. 1979); In re Marriage of DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Minn.
1981); Roberto v. Brown, 107 Wis. 2d 17, 22, 318 N.W.2d 358, 360 (1982); In re Marriage of
Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 15, 318 N.W.2d 918, 924 (1982).
14. In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. at 434, 574 P.2d at 78 (1978) (Carrigan, J.,
dissenting).
15. Lynn v. Lynn, 7 FAm. L. Ri-TR. 3001 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1980).
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beneficiary of a "windfall" at divorce, 6 while other judges have char-
acterized the situation as the classic case of unjust enrichment. 7
Though most courts agree that there is something disturbing and
unfair in these educational degree cases, judges have been unable to
find an equitable solution to the problem. Courts have utilized an ar-
ray of legal remedies - alimony, 18 property settlements,19 rehabilita-
16. See In re Marriage of Sullivan, 127 Cal. App. 3d 656, 680, mod#fted, 134 Cal. App.
3d 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1982); In re Marriage of McManama, 399 N.E.2d 371, 375 (Ind.
1980) (Hunter, J., dissenting); Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
17. See Mahoney v. Mahoney, 175 N.J. Super. 443, 446, 419 A.2d 1149, 1150 (1980),
rey'd, 182 N.J. Super. 598, 442 A.2d 1062 (1982) and Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747,
750 (Okla. 1979). See also Erickson, Spousal Support, supra note 7, at 969; Krauskopf, Rec-
ompense For Financing Spouse's Education, supra note 7, at 391-93. But see Wisner v. Wis-
ner, 129 Ariz. 333, 341, 631 P.2d 115, 123 (Ct. App. 1981) (unjust enrichment, as a legal
concept, is not properly to be applied in a marital setting); and Church v. Church, 96 N.M.
388, 395, 630 P.2d 1243, 1250 (1981) (wife's services held not to be a basis for an equitable
award based on unjust enrichment, applying Virginia law).
18. See Greer v. Greer, 32 Colo. App. 196, 199, 510 P.2d 905, 907 (1973) (alimony in
gross award to wife for same number of years as she supported husband through medical
school); Vaclav v. Vaclav, 96 Mich. App. 584, 588, 293 N.W.2d 613, 617 (1980) ($15,000 per
year permanent alimony to wife who supported husband through medical school); Moss v.
Moss, 80 Mich. App. 693, 695, 264 N.W.2d 97, 98 (1978) ($15,000 alimony in gross award to
wife who worked while husband attended medical school); Wheeler v. Wheeler, 193 Neb.
615, 617, 228 N.W.2d 594, 596 (1975) (increase in alimony award to wife who made substan-
tial contributions to furtherance of husband's education in veterinary medicine); Lira v.
Lira, 68 Ohio App. 2d 160, 169, 428 N.E.2d 445, 449 (1980) ($250.00 alimony per month to
wife who supported husband through medical school, subject to court review as husband's
income increased); Daniels v. Daniels, 20 Ohio Op. 2d 458, 461, 185 N.E.2d 773, 776 (1961)
($24,000 alimony award to wife where both spouses worked and contributed to family main-
tenance during marriage); Shahan v. Shahan, (Okla. Ct. App. 1975) (unpublished decision
summarized at 1 FAM. L. RPTR. 2802) ($28,400 alimony award to wife who helped husband
earn three advanced educational degrees); Diment v. Diment, 531 P.2d 1071, 1073-74 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1975) ($39,600.00 alimony award to wife for her contribution to husband's college
and medical education; permanent alimony award really a "property" award); and DeWitt
v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 62, 296 N.W. 2d 761, 769-70 (1980) (remand for determination of
wife's entitlement to alimony where she helped support husband through law school).
19. See In re Marriage of McManama, 399 N.E.2d 371, 373 (Ind. 1980) (wife awarded
real estate and personal property; $3600 award for contributions to husband's legal educa-
tion vacated); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 173 Ind. App. 661, 666, 365 N.E.2d 792, 796 (1977) (wife
supported husband through Ph.D. program awarded substantially all marital assets, but had
no property interest in husband's future earnings as tenured university professor); Parsons v.
Parsons, 68 Wis. 2d 744, 755, 229 N.W.2d 629, 634-35 (1975) (property award to wife who
helped put husband through medical school increased; long duration marriage). Compare In
re Marriage of Sullivan, 127 Cal. App. 3d 656, 680, modred, 134 Cal. App. 3d 634, 184 Cal,
Rptr. 796 (1982) (community possesses interest in increased value of education acquired
during marriage), and Reen v. Reen, 8 FAM. L. RPTR. 2193 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1981) (medical
degree and license to practice are property and subject to equitable distribution) with In re
Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 461, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668, 677-78 (1979) (hus-
band's legal education not property and not a community asset divisible at divorce); and
Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 135 (1969) (husband's legal
education not a property asset of the community, but wife awarded $89,116.35 in assets).
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tive alimony,20 spousal support 2 and maintenance22 - as well as a
variety of ingenious equitable awards. By invoking principles of fair-
ness, courts have proposed or provided remedies by means of restitu-
tion, reimbursement, implied contract, quasi-contract, implied loan,
unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and recoupment.23
20. See Lockwood v. Lockwood, 354 So. 2d 1267, 1269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (court
to retain jurisdiction to award rehabilitative alimony to wife who helped support husband
through law school); McAllister v. McAllister, 345 So. 2d 352, 355-56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977) (court reversed award of low rehabilitative alimony and awarded higher periodic ali-
mony to wife who aided husband through medical school); cf. Morgan v. Morgan, 81 Misc.
2d 616, 621, 366 N.Y.S.2d 977, 982 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (periodic alimony to wife who
supported husband in law school, to enable wife to complete her own medical studies), modi-
fied, Morgan v. Morgan, 52 A.D.2d 804, 383 N.Y.S.2d 343, 344 (1976). See generally An-
not., 97 A.L.R.3d 740 (1980).
21. See Stansberry v. Stansberry, 580 P.2d 147, 149 (Okla. 1978) (mixed property, ali-
mony, and support award to wife of doctor); Childers v. Childers, 15 Wash. App. 792, 796,
552 P.2d 83, 85-86 (1976) (physician husband ordered to support divorced wife; she obtained
college degree after she supported his medical studies), mod#fied, 89 Wash. 2d. 592, 575 P.2d
201 (1978).
22. See Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 340, 631 P.2d 115, 117, 123 (Ct. App. 1981)
(mixed property and maintenance award to wife of physician); Mori v. Mori, 124 Ariz. 193,
196, 603 P.2d 85, 88 (1979) (lawyer's wife entitled to rehabilitative maintenance to enable
her to pursue higher education after twenty-five years of marriage); Leveck v. Leveck, 614
S.W.2d 710, 714 (Ky. 1981) (lump sum award of $10,000 and periodic maintenance to wife
who supported husband through medical school); In re Marriage of Vanet, 544 S.W.2d 236,
241, 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (property award to wife; future earning capacity of attorney
husband can be considered in awarding maintenance to wife who helped husband through
school); In re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 6, 318 N.W.2d 918, 923-24 (1982) (lump
sum maintenance of $25,000 to wife who supported husband through medical school); Ro-
berto v. Brown, 107 Wis. 2d 17, 23, 318 N.W.2d 358, 360 (1982) (remand for trial court to
consider maintenance award in addition to property settlement); Vf. In re Marriage of Gra-
ham, 194 Colo. 429, 433, 574 P.2d 75, 78 (1978) (maintenance remedy available but not
requested by wife).
In some cases, wives are awarded both property and alimony or maintenance. See
Bowen v. Bowen, 347 So. 2d 675, 676, 678 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Prosser v. Prosser, 156
Neb. 629, 634, 57 N.W.2d 173, 175-76 (1953); Magruder v. Magruder, 190 Neb. 573, 577, 209
N.W.2d 585, 587-88 (1973); Wallahan v. Wallahan, 284 N.W.2d 21, 24, 26-27 (S.D. 1979).
23. See In re Marriage of DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 757-59 (Minn. 1981) (restitution
to wife of monies expended in aiding husband to obtain medical degree); In re Marriage of
Cropp, 5 FAM. L. RPTR. 2957 (D. Minn. 1979) (wife awarded lump sum of $24,624 as restitu-
tion for contributions made to husband's pursuit of medical degree); Lowrey v. Lowrey, 633
S.W.2d 157 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (limited maintenance based on theory of recoupment to
wife who helped husband achieve dentistry degree); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 175 N.J. Super.
443, 447, 419 A.2d 1149, 1150-51 (Ch. Div. 1980), rev'd, 182 N.J. Super. 598, 442 A.2d 1062
(App. Div. 1982) (reimbursement to wife of $5,000 for monies expended by her in aid of
husband's M.B.A. degree); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 751 (Okla. 1979) (cash
award, in lieu of property division, to physician's wife based on quasi-contract theory). But
see Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (rejection of remedy based in
quasi-contract theory); Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981)
($20,000 reimbursement to physician's wife improper under community property principles);
Shetney v. Shetney, 49 Wis. 2d 26, 38, 181 N.W.2d 516, 521-22 (1970) (no enforceable con-
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Inevitably, in awarding compensation to the supporting spouse,
courts have been confronted with the difficult task of quantifying either
the worth of the education or the value of the spouse's support.24 Some
judges have concluded that the value of an educational degree cannot
be calculated and therefore that no award based on worth should be
made. 5 Other judges have argued that the mere difficulty of the task
should not deter the courts from the attempt, since other intangible as-
sets whose values are difficult to calculate have been evaluated and dis-
tributed at divorce.2 6 Thus, the courts draw an analogy to tort awards
in wrongful death or disability cases27 or to the distribution of goodwill
in a spouse's professional practice.28 A California court, invoking well
tract between wife who assisted husband to obtain Ph.D. degree, to in turn aid her in ob-
taining advanced degree).
For commentary on the various equitable remedies, see generally, Brigner, I Put Him
Through Law School, supra note 7, at 43-44; Castleberry, Constitutional Limitations on the
Division ofProperty upon Divorce, supra note 7, at 61-62; Erickson, Spousal Support Toward
the Realization ofEducational Goals, supra note 7, at 968-71; Note, Domestic Relations Rec-
ognition of Wife's Interest, supra note 7, at 191-93; Comment, Professional Education as a
Divisible Asset in Marriage Dissolutions, supra note 7, at 718-19; Recent Cases, Divorce After
Professional School, supra note 7, at 335.
24. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Iowa 1978). The
valuation problem has been analyzed by many commentators. See generally Brigner, I Put
Him Through Law School, supra note 7, at 43-44; Castleberry, Constitutional Limitations on
the Division of Property upon Divorce, supra note 7, at 62; Greene, Dissolution of the "'Educa-
tional Partnership" Marriage, supra note 7, at 296; Kenderdine, Contributions to Spouse's
Education, supra note 7, at 422-32; Kennedy and Thomas, Putting a Value On. Education
and Professional Goodwill, supra note 7, at 5, 39; Schaefer, The Interest of the Community in a
Professional Education, supra note 7, at 92-97; Best (Thankless) Performance in a Supporting
Role, supra note 7, at 51; Note, In Re Marriage of Graham: Education 4cquired During
Marriage, supra note 7, at 729; Note, Professional Education as a Divisible Asset in Marriage
Dissolutions, supra note 7, at 713-20; Note, Recognition of W'fes Interest in Professional De-
gree Earned by Husband During Marriage, supra note 7, at 187; Recent Cases, Divorce After
Professional School, supra note 7, at 333-36.
25. See Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 135 (1969); In re
Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 419, 432, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978); DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis.
2d 44, 58, 296 N.W.2d 761, 767 (1980).
26. See In re Marriage of Sullivan, 127 Cal. App. 3d 656, 680, modfled, 134 Cal. App.
3d 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1982); In re Marriage of McManama, 399 N.E.2d 371, 374 (Ind.
1980) (Hunter, J., dissenting); In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Iowa
1978); Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 269-70 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); In re Marriage of
DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Minn. 1981); Lynn v. Lynn, 7 FAM. L. RvTR. 3001, 3007
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1980); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 752 (Okla. 1979).
27. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 435, 574 P.2d 75, 79 (1978)
(Carrigan, J., dissenting); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 751 (Okla. 1979). A discussion
of analogies to tort recovery can be found in Krauskopf, Recompense For Financing Spouse'r
Education, supra note 7, at 388-89.
28. E.g., In re Marriage of Sullivan, 127 Cal. App. 3d 656, 672, 682, modified, 134 Cal.
App. 3d 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1982). A number of cases have placed a value on a spouse's
interest in his medical or legal partnership or its goodwill. See In re Marriage of Lopez, 38
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settled community property principles,29 suggested that the methods
used in determining the increased profit or enhanced value of a
spouse's separate property could be used in educational degree cases.
30
What emerges is a portrait of the law in disarray - the law con-
fronting a relatively new social and legal problem and recognizing an
inequity. Yet there emerges no consistent basis for the full panoply of
remedies courts currently devise for divorcing spouses. A New Jersey
judge has aptly summarized the confusion of other jurisdictions:
Although it is commendable to say that ". . . equity demands
that the court seek extraordinary remedies to prevent ex-
traordinary injustice", In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d
75, (Sup. Ct. of Colo., 1978, dissent), we cannot travel a tortu-
ous road to find a remedy in a particular case unless we also
apply the same conceptual philosophy to all cases. The attor-
neys and litigants in this state deserve and are entitled to no
Cal. App. 3d 93, 107-11, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 66-69 (1974); In re Marriage of Nicols, 43 Colo.
App. 383, 386-87, 606 P.2d 1314, 1315-16 (1980); Stem v. Stem, 66 N.J. 340, 346-47, 331
A.2d 257, 260-61 (1975); Hurley v. Hurley, 94 N.M. 641, 644, 615 P.2d 256, 259 (1980). But
see Holbrook v. Holbrook, 103 Wis. 2d 327, 352, 309 N.W.2d 343, 351-55 (Ct. App. 1981)
(goodwill of law partnership is not a marital asset to be divided at divorce); Nail v. Nail, 486
S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. 1972) (goodwill of medical practice not a property asset subject to
division at divorce). For discussions of the analogy to valuation of goodwill, see Castle-
berry, Constitutional Limitations on the Division ofproperty upon Divorce, supra note 7, at 58;
Lurvey, Professional Goodwill on Marital Dissolution: Is It Property or Another Name For
AlimonyZ 52 CAL. ST. BAR J. 1, 27 (Jan.-Feb. 1977); Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce,
supra note 8, at 1214-15; Note, Recognition of Wife's Interest in Professional Degree Earned
by Husband During Marriage, supra note 7, at 187. See generally Annot., Accountabilityfor
Good Will of Professional Practice in Actions Arising from Divorce or Separation, 52
A.L.R.3d 1344 (1973); Annot., Evaluation of Interest in Law Firm or Medical Partnershp for
Purposes of Division of Property in Divorce Proceedings, 74 A.L.R.3d 621 (1976).
29. The community property states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. Puerto Rico is also a community property jurisdic-
tion. See Freed and Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States, supra note 8, at 249. As of July 1,
1982, Virginia adopted a system of "equitable distribution" of property rights that closely
resembles community property concepts. See VA. CODE § 20-107.3 (Supp. 1982). In com-
menting on the operation of this statute in relation to professional degrees, one commentator
notes: "It is expected that this question will receive immediate attention in the courts and
will be one of the more hotly contested issues under the new law. The ultimate outcome will
probably turn on policy considerations concerning what is encompassed within the concept
of 'property' as the term is used in the act." The Research Group, Equitable Distribution in
Virginia: An Overview of the New Statute, 31 VA. BAR Nnws 47, 50 (August 1982).
30. In re Marriage of Sullivan, 127 Cal. App. 3d 656, 681-83, modfled, 134 Cal. App. 3d
634, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1982). The Sullivan court was referring to the so-called Van Camp
and Pereira methods of calculating a fair rate of return on investment in a spouse's separate
property. See Van Camp v. Van Camp, 53 Cal. App. 17, 199 P. 885 (1921); Pereira v.
Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 103 P. 488 (1909); Beam v. Bank of America, 6 Cal. 3d 12, 98 Cal. Rptr.
137, 490 P.2d 257 (1971). For a discussion of these methods of valuation, see generally,
REPPY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA 139-44 (1980).
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less than relative certainty and consistency in equitable distri-
bution. . . . To find that a non-licensed spouse in one case is
entitled to such distribution and a non-licensed spouse in an-
other case is not, is to substitute legal mumbo-jumbo for legal
analysis and application."
This article will focus on the problem of the valuation of an educa-
tional degree at divorce.32 Educational degree cases present two
problems: Is the educational degree a marital property asset subject to
division at divorce,33 and if so, how can or should such a degree be
valued?34 There has been much argument concerning the property is-
sue, without satisfactory results. In fact, modem courts recognize many
intangibles as property, although their characteristics are not materially
different from an educational degree. As will be discussed below, an
educational degree should also be recognized as property.
An exclusive focus on the property issue, however, ignores the
knotty problem of valuation. Many courts have anguished over the
first issue, only to dismiss the difficult valuation problem without much
31. Lynn v. Lynn, 7 FAM. L. RPTR. 3001, 3005-06 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1980).
32. A great deal of commentary has been written on these educational degree cases, see
supra note 7, and it is not the purpose of this article to synthesize or resummarize these
materials. Similarly, it is not the purpose of this article to describe, at length, the weaknesses
of the legal and equitable remedies proposed by courts and commentators. This criticism
has been well articulated by others. See supra notes 23 and 24. Erickson's article contains
an excellent criticism of the legal and equitable remedies used by the courts. She points out
that alimony is still considered in many states to be a support award, rather than a matter of
entitlement. In some states alimony is dependent on the wife's lifestyle and moral behavior;
it can be annulled or modified retroactively. Alimony usually ends if the wife remarries.
Property awards have two disadvantages: The award can be discharged in bankruptcy, and
if there is no marital property, there is nothing to divide. As for possible equitable remedies,
Erickson points out that reimbursement is not available unless the wife has an express prom-
ise of repayment, and a constructive trust is not feasible unless the wife can prove that her
husband was unjustly enriched and fraudulently breached his agreement to her. Theories
based on quasi-contract are not likely to succeed in a matrimonial setting, and strict contract
arguments are unlikely to succeed because of vague contract terms. See Erickson, Spousal
Support, supra note 7, at 959-70; see also Krauskopf, Recompense For Financing Spouse's
Education, supra note 7, at 388-95.
33. See Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 339, 631 P.2d 115, 121 (Ct. App. 1981); In re
Marriage of Sullivan, 127 Cal. App. 3d 656, 668, modfied, 134 Cal. App. 3d 634, 184 Cal.
Rptr. 796 (1982); In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 460, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668,
677 (1979); In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 432, 574 P.2d 75, 76 (1978); Wilcox v.
Wilcox, 173 Ind. App. 661, 662, 365 N.E.2d 792, 794 (1977); In re Marriage of Cropp, 5
FAM. L. RPTR. 2957, 2958 (D. Minn. 1979); Lynn v. Lynn, 7 FAM. L. RPTR. 3001, 3002 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1980); Lira v. Lira, 68 Ohio App. 2d 164, 166-67, 428 N.E.2d 445, 447 (1980);
Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 749 (Okla. 1979); Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656,
657 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); In re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 7-8, 318 N.W.2d 918,
921 (1982); DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 45-46, 296 N.W.2d 761, 762 (1980).
34. See supra note 24.
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analysis. 35 The valuation of an educational degree is unlike the valua-
tion of wrongful death awards or professional goodwill. Although
some courts have estimated the degree to be worth the present value of
the attributable income stream, such a calculation is unrealistic in view
of the many variables involved.36 Ultimately, any attempt to value the
worth of an educational degree deteriorates into speculation37 largely
influenced by the widely varying testimony of competing economic
experts.38
A fair solution to this problem must enable the supporting spouse
to share in the degree's value if it was earned during the marriage with
the expectation that it would provide mutual benefits. Yet the remedy
must also avoid a harsh penalty that compels the student spouse to re-
linquish the just rewards of hard work and ambition. In addition, an
equitable award must apply consistently to marriages of varying dura-
tion,39 as well as to degrees that vary greatly inthe extent to which they
35. See supra note 26.
36. This objection was best stated by Justice Callow, concurring in In re Marriage of
Lundberg:
I would specifically reject any compensable formula based upon future earning
potential. Attempting to value the percentage of future eanings to which the sup-
porting spouse is entitled is too speculative to be judicially recognizable. There is
no guarantee that the spouse with the enhanced education will actually practice in
the particular field or earn the average amounts the economists have calculated.
Too many intangibles are associated with an enhanced education or degree to en-
able a court to prospectively value it in any award to a supporting spouse.
107 Wis. 2d 1, 16, 318 N.W.2d 918, 925 (Callow, J., concurring); see also Inman v. Inman,
578 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 56-57, 296
N.W.2d 761, 767 (1980).
37. Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d at 16, 318 N.W.2d at 925. The speculation problem in valu-
ing an educational degree or license has been noted by many commentators. See generally
Note, Domestic Relations: Recognition of Wfe's Interest, supra note 7, at 187; Schaefer, The
interest of the Community in Professional Education, supra note 7, at 611; Best (Thankless)
Peiformance in a Supporting Role, supra note 7, at 51; Note, In re Marriage of Graham -
Education Acquired During Marriage, supra note 7, at 72; Note, Professional Education as a
Divisible Asset in Marriage Dissolutions, supra note 7, at 715.
38. The utilization, or suggested utilization, of expert economic testimony to establish
either the value of the degree or the spouse's contributions to the education has occurred in
some cases. See In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 431, 435, 574 P.2d 75, 76, 79
(1978); In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Iowa 1978); Lira v. Lira, 68
Ohio App. 2d 164, 166-67, 428 N.E.2d 445, 447 (1980); Lynn v. Lynn, 7 FAM. L. RPrR. 3001,
3007 (Mass. P. and Fain. Ct. 1980); In re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 5, 318
N.W.2d 918, 920 (1982); see also Brigner, IPut Him Through School, supra note 7, at 43-44;
Note, Professional Education as a Divisible Asset in Marriage Dissolutions, supra note 7, at
715-16; Recent Case, Divorce After Professional School, supra note 7, at 333-34.
39. Typically, in long duration marriages the couple has accumulated substantial prop-
erty, which allows the judge to generously distribute property to the wife, rather than to
address the issue of the property nature of her husband's educational degree. See supra
Section I and accompanying notes. See generally Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce,
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increase future earnings. Finally, a fair settlement must be workable,
so the courts can apply it with relative ease and preferably without the
need to use expensive economic experts whose fees in the divorce con-
text are unjustified.
The first section of this article will examine some current remedies
and will demonstrate that awards in the past have depended more on
the facts of the case than on the law. This case-by-case relief creates
unacceptable inconsistencies between long and short duration mar-
riages. The next section will discuss the property issue and its confused
disposition by various courts. The third section focuses on the valua-
tion problem and reviews attempted valuations by the courts, as well as
other proposed methods of valuation. The currently applied valuation
methods and proposed formulas are all problematic and should be
avoided. This article will conclude with a proposed remedy for recom-
pense to the supporting spouse based upon a labor theory of value.
This proposed remedy combines the virtues of fairness and workability.
II. THE PROBLEM OF UNPRINCIPLED AND ARBITRARY REMEDIES
Many educational degree cases involve short duration marriages
where one spouse supported the other through professional school.
Typically, the young couple has few assets and is in debt at the time of
dissolution. The only valuable asset, or so the supporting spouse
claims, is the educational degree acquired during marriage.40 Many
judges have concluded that their hands are tied by the statutory
schemes governing property and support awards at dissolution.4'
supra note 8. At least one court has found the inconsistencies engendered by this case-by-
case approach to be objectionable:
This court cannot accept that line of cases which looks to each individual situation
to determine whether an educational degree or license is subject to equitable distri-
bution. The accumulation of material, traditional absolutely distributable assets
should not be a factor. Whether the non-degreed or non-licensed spouse is left
empty-handed should not be a factor to be considered.
Lynn v. Lynn, 7 FAM. L. Rvra. 3001, 3005 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1981).
40. See supra note 8.
41. "The modem functions of property division and maintenance are consistent with
both the economic theories and the traditional legal principles previously analyzed; there-
fore, courts implementing the state dissolution statutes should be able to interpret them to
further incentives for investment in a spouse's education. The danger of failure lies primarily
in refusals by courts to make awards because of inadequate presentation of claims or overly
narrow interpretations of the statutory language." Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing
Spouse's Education, supra note 7, 398; see also id at 395-409. A restrictive reading of the
California statutory provision for spousal support appears in In re Marriage of Sullivan, 127
Cal. App. 3d 656, 664-68, mod#Fed, 134 Cal. App. 3d 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1982). In the
first Sullivan decision, the court rejected the wife's contention that she should have been
given an award of spousal support based on the value of her husband's medical education,
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Thus, in many states, alimony, maintenance, or support are not avail-
able remedies because both spouses are capable of self-support. Judges
in such jurisdictions must confront the property issue if the supporting
spouse is to be fairly compensated.
In these cases judges have first analyzed the property nature of the
educational degree and then decided on available relief. An examina-
tion of all educational degree cases, however, leads to a different obser-
vation. Courts' approaches have depended most of all on the duration
of the marriage and the accumulation of assets at the time of divorce.42
In a lengthy marriage, where the couple has acquired a good deal of
property, judges have generally made a generous property settlement
to the supporting spouse and have indicated that the settlement in-
cludes a recompense for contributions to the student spouse.43 There-
even though she was employed and earning over $26,000 at the time of the divorce. The
court agreed with the husband's argument that spousal support could not be used as a means
of making an "in lieu of' property award. The court noted that its hands were tied by the
law: "As opposed to the rather broad equitable discretion that has been vested in the trial
courts of most other jurisdictions regarding the matter of awards of maintenance or alimony,
the matter of spousal support in California is governed primarily by statute .. " 127 Cal.
App. 3d at 664-65. "California courts simply do not have the same latitude in awarding
spousal support as do the courts in many other jurisdictions where alimony awards are often
used to prevent an unjust result." Id at 688.
Sullivan referred to Stern v Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975), In re Marriage of
Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978), and In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d
885 (Iowa 1978), as three cases where state judges had more flexibility in interpreting their
state statutes. Perhaps the most dramatic example of a court flexibly interpreting its powers
is in In re Marriage of DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981). There the court ordered
restitution to the wife who had expended her earnings for the couple's living expenses and
her husband's medical education expenses. The husband argued, on appeal, that the trial
court was without the power to make this restitutionary award because there was no specific
statute authorizing such relief. The appellate court disagreed and indicated that trial courts
in divorce actions have broad powers:
Although dissolution is a statutory action and the authority of the trial court is
limited to that provided for by statute,. .. [t]he district courts are guided by equi-
table principles in determining the rights and liabilities of the parties upon a disso-
lution of the marriage relationship. . . .The district court therefore has inherent
power to grant equitable relief 'as the facts in each particular case and the ends of
justice may require.'
309 N.W.2d at 757-58 (citations omitted).
42. One commentator has noted this phenomenon in the context of awards of rehabilita-
tive spousal support in California: "The approach the court will follow appears to depend on
the duration of the marriage and the financial condition of the supporting spouse. Presently,
no case or statutory law distinguishes, in terms of years, between a short-term, middle-term,
or long-term marriage." Comment, Rehabilitative Spousal Support, supra note 7, at 65 1.
43. For the purposes of discussion here, a long duration marriage is considered to be any
marriage that has lasted ten years or longer, a short duration marriage is considered to be
one lasting up to ten years. Because of the very long educational periods for some profes-
sional fields, particularly in medicine, the student spouse may spend ten years of the mar-
riage in college, medical school, and then specialized training, only to file for divorce at this
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fore, in many common law and equitable distribution jurisdictions,
awards to the supporting spouse often contain a disguised compensa-
tion for contributions to the student spouse, without expressly stating
that the award is a distribution of property. In most long duration mar-
riages, then, judges avoid or sidestep the property issue. These deci-
sions are confusing, evasive, unprincipled, and unfair.
In short, judges have looked to the facts first, rather than to the
law. If they can avoid confronting the property issue, they will. Be-
yond the property characterization is the more troubling problem of
how to value the degree once it is deemed to be a marital asset. Only a
case-by-case analysis determines whether an educational degree is an
asset subject to division at dissolution. This is an unacceptable ap-
proach: "The. . .accumulation of material, traditional absolutely dis-
tributable assets should not be a factor. Whether the non-degreed or
non-licensed spouse is left empty-handed should not be a factor to be
considered . . . . Either a professional degree and/or license is or is
not property.""
These inconsistencies in approach are exemplified by two Ken-
tucky cases, Inman v. Inman45 and Leveck v. Leveck. 46 Although the
Inmans had been married for seventeen years at the time of their di-
vorce, the facts of their case more closely resemble the typical short
point. Because many of these cases more closely resemble the short duration/no assets fact
pattern, a ten year cut-off is appropriate.
For long duration marriages where the court has made a generous property settlement
to the wife, in part as recompense for her contributions to her husband's professional educa-
tion and development, see Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 335, 631 P.2d 115, 117 (Ct. App.
1981) (wife awarded $80,000 in property after 14 years of marriage); Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal.
App. 2d 736, 741, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 135 (1969) (wife awarded $111,500.97 in community
assets after 17 years of marriage); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 173 Ind. App. 661, 666, 365 N.E.2d 792,
794 (1977) (wife awarded $20,000 equity in family residence and $900 a month permanent
alimony after 14 years of marriage); Vaclav v. Vaclav, 96 Mich. App. 593, 293 N.W.2d 613,
617 (1980) (wife entitled to 60% of proceeds of sale of residence and $15,000 a -year in per-
manent alimony after 15 years of marriage); In re Marriage of Vanet, 544 S.W.2d 236, 241
(Mo. 1976) (no abuse of discretion for trial court to award wife 74% of marital property after
21 years of marriage); Diment v. Diment, 531 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975)
($39,600 alimony award to wife based on husband's increased earning capacity through
medical education acquired during 18 year marriage); Wallahan v. Wallahan, 284 N.W.2d
21 (S.D. 1979) (award of $195,000 in property assets and $700 a month alimony to wife who
put husband through college and law school during 22 year marriage); DeWitt v. DeWitt,
107 Wis. 2d 50,296 N.W.2d 761,764, 765 (1980) (net property award to wife of $37,151 after
10 years of marriage); Parsons v. Parsons, 68 Wis. 2d 744, 755, 229 N.W.2d 629, 634-36
(1975) (trial court abused discretion in awarding wife only 40% of marital assets after 26 year
marriage; increased on appeal to 48% plus $800 a month alimony).
44. See Lynn v. Lynn, 7 FAM. L. RP.Rm. 3001, 3005, 3006 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1980).
45. Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
46. Leveck v. Leveck, 614 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
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duration marriage. Mrs. Inman worked throughout the marriage, but
both spouses contributed financially to Mr. Inman's dental school edu-
cation. At the time of their divorce proceedings the couple's mortgage
had been foreclosed because of failure to make payments. The Inmans
were heavily in debt, and their net worth was zero. The Kentucky
Court of Appeals noted that although the couple had a lifestyle that
reflected prosperity, the Inmans were in fact on the verge of bank-
ruptcy.47 The trial court found that the husband's license to practice
dentistry was marital property48 and allocated most of the valuable as-
sets, including the home, to Mrs. Inman on the theory that her hus-
band's future earning capacity was a marital asset.49
On appeal the Kentucky Court of Appeals stated that although it
had reservations about characterizing a professional license as an asset,
there were some situations where treating the professional license as
property would be the only way of achieving an equitable result.
50
Such an instance could occur where one spouse had supported the
other through school and there was little or no marital property accu-
mulated at the time of divorce. In this event the supporting spouse,
who had devoted several years "to an 'investment' in future family
prosperity," would not realize any return on that investment, while the
other spouse would receive a windfall in the form of an increased earn-
ing capacity.5 The court further noted that the United States Supreme
Court had recently found property interests in personal and nontrans-
ferable tenured federal employment and welfare benefits. Therefore,
those courts that refused to be "hamstrung by narrow definitions of
'property"' were in distinguished company.52 On remand, if the court
were to find that Mrs. Inman had a property interest in her husband's
professional degree, this interest should be measured by her monetary
47. Inman, 578 S.W.2d at 267. The Inmans owned an expensive home and several vehi-
cles. During 1975-77, Dr. Inman earned approximately $90,000 from his dental practice. In
1977 his net income fell to less than $18,000. (There was expert testimony to the effect that a
dentist employing reasonable business practices should have been able to net 45-50% of his
gross income.) As Dr. Inman failed to pay mortgage payments, the bank foreclosed on the
Inman residence.
48. Id at 267. Although the Meade circuit court held that the license to practice den-
tistry was marital property, it did not attempt to value it. "Apparently proceeding under the
theory that Dr. Inman's future earning capacity is marital property, the court allocated to
Mrs. Inman most of the valuable marital assets, including the marital domicile."
49. Id The circuit court had provided that, in the event of a foreclosure on the home,
Mr. Inman was to pay Mrs. Inman $60,000 over the next ten years. Id
50. Id at 268.
51. Id
52. Id at 269 (citing Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1974)).
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investment in the degree, "the amount spent for direct support and
school expenses during the period of education, plus reasonable inter-
est and adjustments for inflation." 3
Two years after Inman, the Kentucky Court of Appeals decided
another educational degree case, Leveck v. Leveck. 54 In this case the
wife, a registered nurse, supported the couple while her husband at-
tended medical school; she paid their living expenses, her husband's
medical school tuition, and the majority of costs for books and labora-
tory fees." Once her husband had completed his third year of medical
school, she stopped working, and the family lived off the husband's
income for the next seven and one-half years. After eleven years of
marriage, the divorce court awarded Mrs. Leveck a lump sum of
$10,000 and periodic maintenance; the court indicated that the lump
sum included compensation for her contributions to her husband's
medical education.
56
On appeal, Mrs. Leveck argued that the trial court erred when it
did not specifically find her husband's medical license to be marital
property, a principle established in Inman. The appellate court re-
jected this contention, indicating that this was an attempt to broaden
the holding of Inman. The appellate court pointed out that classifying
the license as marital property was the only way the trial court could
achieve a fair result in Inman because there was no other marital prop-
erty and Mrs. Inman was not eligible for maintenance.5 7 In the
Levecks' case, however, an equitable result was possible without char-
acterizing the license as marital property, because the wife was entitled
to maintenance.58
Viewed together, Inman and Leveck illustrate that the Kentucky
courts looked to the facts first and then determined whether it was nec-
essary to characterize the degree as property. In many states, if there
are enough marital assets or if maintenance is possible, the courts will
53. Inman, 578 S.W.2d at 269-70.
54. Leveck v. Leveck, 614 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
55. Id at 711. Mrs. Leveck worked as a psychiatric nurse while her husband attended
Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. She continued to work as a nurse for three years
while her husband went to medical school at the University of Colorado. During his final
year of medical school she did not work but he received pay from the Army Senior Medical
Program.
56. Id at 712.
57. Id ("The trial court stated that the lump sum award included compensation for her
investment in Terrence's medical education. In this case, an equitable result was able to be
reached without treatment of the license as marital property, because Judith was entitled to
maintenance.").
58. Id
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make a settlement and declare that the award includes recompense for
the supporting spouse's contributions to the education. 9 Such analysis,
however, begs the real question of whether the degree is property and
what it is worth to the supporting spouse and the professional practi-
tioner. If such recompense is supposed to represent a "return on in-
vestment" to the supporting spouse, it is difficult to know what is being
valued, and at what rate of return. This obfuscated recompense is un-
acceptable, particularly where another court in the same state has de-
clared the degree to be marital property and ordered a calculation of
the investment. Moreover, it is possible for a supporting spouse in the
no-asset situation to receive a more advantageous settlement than a
spouse in a long duration marriage where there is accumulated
property.
This pattern of legal reasoning is especially evident in longer dura-
tion marriages. For example, in Wisner v. Wisner6 ° the Arizona Court
of Appeals upheld an award of limited maintenance and a property
allocation of $80,000 to a physician's wife after fourteen years of mar-
riage. The court rejected the wife's "novel argument" that her hus-
band's medical degree and license to practice were community property
because the education had been acquired during the marriage.6 After
reviewing a variety of educational degree cases, the court adopted the
Colorado Supreme Court's conclusion in In re Marriage of Graham
that an educational degree is not marital property.6" The court noted
that an important factor to consider in the "overall picture" was the
59. For a discussion of the Inman and Leveck cases, see Mazanec, The Inman Case,
supra note 7, at 18-19. See also Note, Intangible Educational and Professional Attainments As
Divisible Marital Property, supra note 7 (critical of Inman holding); Kenderdine, Contribu-
tions To Spouse's Education, supra note 7, at 426 (proposed modification of Inman formula
for recompense).
60. 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (Ct. App. 1981). Mrs. Wisner worked as a nurse during
her husband's final year in medical school, but she did not work outside the home during
their marriage. She claimed that under Arizona community property principles, insofar as
her husband's medical license and board certification in surgery were obtained during their
marriage, they were community property and that she was entitled to one-half of their value.
At the time of divorce Mrs. Wisner was 39 and was thinking about further schooling. Id at
334-35, 339, 631 P.2d at 116-17, 121.
61. Id at 340, 631 P.2d at 122.
62. Id The court cited and reviewed In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d
75 (1978); Hurley v. Hurley, 94 N.M. 641, 615 P.2d 256 (1980), (overruled on other grounds in
Ellsworth v. Ellsworth, 97 N.M. 133, 637 P.2d 564 (1981)); Muckleroy v. Muckleroy, 84
N.M. 14, 498 P.2d 1357 (1972); Stem v. Stem, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975); In re Mar-
riage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979); Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal.
App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969); In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa
1978); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979); contra, Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d
266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) and Lynn v. Lynn, 7 FAm. L. RpR. 3001 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1980).
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extent to which the supporting spouse had already benefited during the
marriage from her husband's increased earning capacity:
However, the acquisition of a considerable estate obviously
solves this problem. Such is the situation here. [The] [w]ife
shared in the fruits of [her] husband's education for many
years during their marriage, and ultimately realized a value
therefrom by a substantial award to her of the community as-
sets, plus spousal maintenance .... 63
Two California decisions similarly avoided the property issue. In
Todd v. Todd, I a California court of appeal held that a spouse's educa-
tion could not be classified as a community asset, but noted that the
accumulated property acquired during the seventeen-year marriage
was the result of the husband's legal education and practice. There-
fore, the wife realized the value of her contribution to her husband's
career in an award to her of $111,500.97.65 This reasoning was fol-
lowed in Aufmuth v. Aufmuth, 66 where a California court of appeal
again refused to characterize a husband's legal education as a commu-
nity asset. "[T]o the extent [that] community assets were the product of
[the] husband's legal education, [the] wife has realized their value in
the award of these assets to her."
67
Similarly, the Michigan Court of Appeals in Vaclav v. Vaclav va-
cated a three-year, $15,000 annual award to a physician's wife, di-
63. Wirner, 129 Ariz. at 341, 631 P.2d at 123.
64. Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969). In Todd the wife
worked during the period her husband attended law school and began his practice. While
he was attending law school, the husband received benefits from the Cal-Vet and G.I. pro-
grams. At the time of divorce the couple had accumulated over $200,000 in assets and the
husband's practice was netting approximately $23,412 per year. The wife argued that her
husband's education, which was partially funded by community earnings, was a community
asset. Id at 790, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
65. Id at 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 135. The husband was awarded $89,116.35 in assets.
66. In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979) disap-
proved on other grounds inIn re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 815, 614 P.2d 285, 166
Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980). InAufmuth, the wife worked as a teacher while her husband attended
law school; he worked part-time as a clerk. A loan paid for his third year of law school
because his wife stopped working after the birth of a child. At the time of trial the Aufmuths
owned a house with a fair market value of $125,000. Mrs. Aufmuth was not employed after
the birth of their child. .d at 452-53, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 672.
67. Id at 461, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 677. The court also thought that characterizing a degree
as property would violate another aspect of California community property principles: "A
determination that such an 'asset' is community property would require a division of post
dissolution earnings to the extent that they are attributable to the law degree, even though
such earnings are by definition the separate property of the acquiring spouse." Id at 461,
152 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
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vorced after fifteen years of marriage.68 At the time of divorce the
husband, who had been supported through medical school by his wife,
was earning a net taxable income of $111,000 a year. The appellate
court held that this award. was an abuse of discretion and ordered
$15,000 annual permanent alimony.6 9 Relying on another Michigan
decision, Moss v. Moss, 70 the appellate court stated that a medical de-
gree acquired during marriage was an asset for property settlement
purposes. The wife, the court reasoned, was "justifiably entitled to the
greater share of the marital estate because of the disparate earning ca-
pacity of the parties . . . .,
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals also announced that a support-
ing spouse is entitled to a greater share of the marital estate in Diment v.
Diment. 72 In this case the trial court awarded the wife $39,600 in per-
manent alimony after eighteen years of marriage. The wife had
worked to put the husband through both college and medical school.
73
In upholding the trial court's award, the appellate court stressed that
the award was not based upon an interest in the doctor's medical
practice:
Although the award of money is termed "permanent ali-
mony", it is in substance a property award for the contribu-
tions which plaintiff made to defendant's increase in earning
capacity. Without this award, plaintiff would be left with
nothing to show for her contributions, financial and other-
wise, to approximately eighteen years of marriage, which ena-
bled the defendant to acquire a valuable college and medical
school education that has greatly enhanced his earning
capacity.
74
The confused analysis in educational degree cases is demonstrated
in recent cases involving short duration/no-asset marriages where the
courts must inevitably confront the property issue. For example, in In
re Marriage of Sullivan,75 the wife worked during the ten-year marriage
68. Vaclav v. Vaclav, 96 Mich. App. 584, 591, 293 N.W.2d 613, 616 (1980).
69. Id. at 519-92, 293 N.W.2d at 616-17.
70. Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich. App. 693, 264 N.W.2d 97 (1978).
71. Vaclav, 96 Mich. App. at 592, 293 N.W.2d at 617.
72. Diment v. Diment, 531 P.2d 1071 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975). In Diment the wife worked
to support her husband through both college and medical school. There was no tangible
marital property to divide at the time of divorce because the husband had experienced vari-
ous emotional problems and had declared bankruptcy. Id at 1073.
73. Id
74. Id
75. In re Marrriage of Sullivan, 127 Cal. App. 3d 656 (1982). This was the first Sullivan
decision. The Sullivan case was reheard by the same panel of judges, who modified their
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while her husband completed college, medical school, and specialized
training in urology. At separation their assets consisted of some used
furniture and two automobiles.76 With no assets to compensate the
wife, and unable to award her support or maintenance, the court felt
compelled to find some kind of interest in the educational degree:
We therefore hold, absent an agreement to the contrary,
where the community has not received any real economic
benefit from the acquisition by one of the parties of an educa-
tion, degree and/or professional license during the marriage,
that as a minimum the community should be reimbursed for
the amount of any community funds that were expended to
acquire the education, degree and license. Not to provide for
at least this minimal remedy in this type of situation would
have the effect of countenancing a situation where spouses in
the position of Mark would be allowed to walk away from a
marriage with a "windfall" that might have great value.77
Similarly, in Mahoney v. Mahoney,78 where the wife supported the
household while her husband earned a master's degree in business ad-
ministration, there were no substantial assets acquired during the mar-
previous decision by finding that the legal education was not property. See In re Marriage
of Sullivan, 134 Cal. App. 3d 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1982). The Sullivans met and married
while in college and were financially assisted by their parents during these years. When the
husband started medical school, his wife worked part-time and later full-time to support
them. They moved to Oregon for the husband's internship, where the wife worked part-time
and contributed more than half the community income. The couple subsequently returned
to California where, after Mr. Sullivan completed his residency, the couple separated. By the
time of trial the husband had set up a private medical practice specializing in urology. The
wife had been employed at the University of California (Irvine) as a senior budget analyst,
earning about $21,000 per year. At the time of trial she had found new employment and was
earning approximately $26,400 a year. 127 Cal. App. 3d at 660.
76. Id at 661. According to a stipulated agreement, the wife received $500, some of the
furniture, and her automobile for which she was obligated to make payments. 127 Cal. App.
3d at 661, n.3.
77. Id at 679-80. This holding was modified on rehearing before the same panel, only
eight months later. The court recognized that "the starting premise [that degree was prop-
erty] for the holding previously reached [was] wrong." See In re Marriage of Sullivan, 134
Cal. App. 3d 634, 641, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796, 800 (1982).
78. 175 N.J. Super. 443, 419 A.2d 1149 (Ch. Div. 1980). The Superior Court, Appellate
Division, reversed this holding on appeal. See Mahoney v. Mahoney, 182 N.J. Super. 598,
442 A.2d 1062 (App. Div. 1982). The appellate court concluded that it was bound by the
decision in Stem v. Stem, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975), that a spouse's earning capacity
was not a separate property item under the New Jersey code. The court adopted the Graham
court's reasoning that an educational degree is not property. See In re Marriage of Graham,
194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978). The appellate court in Mahoney further noted that it
disagreed with the Chancery Division's unpublished opinion in Lynn v. Lynn, 7 FAM. L.
RPTR. 3001 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1981). 182 N.J. Super. at 604 n.3, 442 A.2d at 1065 n.3.
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riage. The wife testified that while her husband pursued his master's
degree, she had contributed more than $28,700 for rent, food, entertain-
ment, utilities, and debt service. Viewing these facts, the New Jersey
divorce court held that the husband's education and degree constituted
a property right subject to equitable offset upon the dissolution of the
marriage.
79
In In re Marriage of Lundberg, 8 0 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
concluded that the husband's medical degree was the most significant
asset of the marriage, and therefore an award of $25,000 maintenance
to the wife was justified.8' Again, the wife had supported the couple
while the husband attended medical school. The court found that she
contributed over $30,000 more to the marriage than her husband and
that they had little property to divide. In construing the Wisconsin Di-
vorce Reform Act, 2 the court noted that where spouses had accumu-
lated substantial property, the supporting spouse could be compensated
by increasing his or her share of the assets, but where there were few
assets to divide, it was only fair that the wife be compensated for "her
costs and foregone opportunities resulting from the support of [her hus-
band] while he was in school."83
These cases demonstrate how difficult it is to predict whether any
particular divorce court will determine that an educational degree is
property subject to distribution. A great deal depends on the length of
the marriage and the accumulation of assets at the time of divorce.
79. Id. at 447, 419 A.2d at 1150-51. The court indicated: "There can be no doubt that
real dollars were contributed by Mrs. Mahoney as an investment in her future marriage
which is now dissolved. . . .The traditional notions of the male being the wage earner of
the marriage are being rejected by [the] many and conflicting roles which couples assume in
a marriage today and certainly were discarded herein." Id. at 446-47, 419 A.2d at 1150.
80. In re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982).
81. Id. at 14, 318 N.W.2d at 924 ("It is only fair that Judy be compensated for her costs
and foregone opportunities resulting from her support of [her husband] while he was in
school").
82. Divorce Reform Act, WIs. STAT. § 105 (1977). The Wisconsin Legislature subse-
quently amended the maintenance statute to include a provision that allowed courts to alter
property distribution by taking into account "the contribution by one party to the education,
training or increased earning power of the other." See Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d at 13 n.3, 318
N.W.2d at 924 n.3. Iowa, Pennsylvania, and Vermont also have this statutory language in
their alimony, maintenance and property settlement provisions. See IOWA CODE § 598.21(e)
(1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 401(6) (1983); VT. ST. ANN. tit. 14 § 751(5) (1974). In addi-
tion, Georgia and Florida have incorporated the following factor in alimony consideration:
"The contribution of each party to the marriage, including, but not limited to, services ren-
dered in homemaking, child care, education and career building of the otherparty." (emphasis
added). See GA. CODE § 30-209(6) (1982); FLA. STAT. CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 61.08 (1983).
83. In re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d at 14, 318 N.W.2d at 924.
1983]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
While the legal underpinnings of this case-by-case determination are
founded in the divorce court's equitable powers, more often than not
the result appears to represent a desire by the courts to avoid the prop-
erty and valuation issues. These confficting and inconsistent ap-
proaches in different jurisdictions reveal the arbitrariness of awards in
educational degree cases. At its worst, the unpredictable pattern of re-
lief within the same jurisdiction is simply unprincipled. To devise a
fair remedy in all cases, courts must begin with a reasoned basis for
their awards. This basis should be the recognition that an educational
degree is a property asset.
III. THE PROPERTY DEBATE: Is AN EDUCATIONAL DEGREE A
MARITAL PROPERTY ASSET?
Under contemporary, expanded notions of property, an educa-
tional degree should be characterized as property. The conclusion of
the Colorado Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Graham,84 that an
education degree is not property, is therefore incorrect. Courts should
abandon the Graham court's rationale and recognize the property na-
ture of a degree as the basis for a fair award to the supporting spouse.
Unfortunately, the property debate has only diverted attention from
the real issue in educational degree cases: the valuation problem. The
property debate has been as confused as the remedies that have been
formulated by the courts.
The property issue was first raised in Todd v. Todd,8 where the
California Court of Appeal, in one short sentence, suggested that "[alt
best, education is an intangible property right, the value of which, be-
cause of its character, cannot have a monetary value placed upon it for
division between spouses."'8 6 The court suggested that even though the
84. In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978).
85. 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969). In Todd, the husband and wife were
married for 17 years at the time of their separation. The wife worked during the entire time
her husband attended law school, and her earnings were community property that supported
the couple during this period, although her husband did receive veteran's benefits. At the
time of divorce the couple had more than $200,000 in assets and the husband's practice was
netting approximately $23,500 a year. The wife argued that her husband's education, which
was partially paid for with community funds, was a community asset that had substantial
worth. The wife introduced expert testimony on the value of the education, which included
the age of her husband, his health, the expected duration of his career, and his average
annual earnings from his law practice. The expert testified that the husband could be ex-
pected to earn $519,746 until he retired at age 65, and placed the value of the education at
$308,000. The court found that the value of "this claimed asset was nothing - $0." 272
Cal. App. 2d at 789-90, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
86. Id at 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
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husband's law school education was acquired with community
money,8 7 it was extremely doubtful that the education itself could be
deemed "community property. ' 88 Thus, without definitely concluding
that an educational degree was not property (and at the same time inti-
mating that such an education does in fact constitute an intangible
property right), the Todd decision came to stand for the proposition
that not only was a law degree not community property, but it was also
not marital property to be divided at dissolution.89
The Colorado Supreme Court adopted this interpretation of Todd
in In re Marriage of Graham. 90 However, the Graham court expressly
stated that an educational degree is not property. The court's explana-
tion is the most often cited rationale for denying property status to an
educational degree or professional license:9'
An educational degree, such as an M.B.A., is simply not
encompassed even by the, broad views of the concept of
87. Under California community property principles, all assets acquired during the mar-
riage, including the earnings of each spouse, are community property. California Civil Code
§ 5 110 defines community property as that "acquired during the marriage," in contrast to
separate property which is acquired by gift, bequest, or devise. See CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 5110, 5107, 5108 (West 1970). See also REPPY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA
at 62-63, 67 (1981).
88. Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d at 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
89. See In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. at 432, 574 P.2d at 77. The holding in
Todd was followed by the California Court of Appeal inln re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal.
App. 3d 446, 461, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668, 677 (1979), where the court again rejected a wife's
claim that her husband's legal education was a community asset because community funds,
as well as time and effort, had been utilized to obtain the professional degree. While af-
firming Todd, the court further noted that a determination that the education was a commu-
nity asset "would require a division of post dissolution earnings to the extent that they are
attributable to the law degree, even though such earnings are by definition the separate
property of the acquiring spouse." 89 Cal. App. 3d at 461, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 678. See also In
re Marriage of Sullivan, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796, modifying 127 Cal.
App. 3d 656 (1982).
90. In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978). In Graham the trial
court determined that the wife had contributed seventy percent of the financial support
while her husband attended college to receive an engineering degree and then an M.B.A. At
the time of their divorce after six years of marriage, they had accumulated no assets and the
husband was employed as an executive assistant in a large corporation. The trial court
found that the education was jointly owned property and valued the M.B.A. at $82,836. The
wife was awarded $33,134 (payable in $100 monthly installments). The Court of Appeals
reversed, a decision affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court. Id at 430, 574 P.2d at 76.
91. See Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 339, 631 P.2d 115, 121-22 (Ct. App. 1981); In re
Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Iowa 1978); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 182 N.J.
Super. 598, 442 A.2d 11062 (1982), rev'g Mahoney v. Mahoney, 175 N.J. Super. 443, 419
A.2d 1149 (1980); Lira v. Lira, 68 Ohio App. 2d 164, 168, 428 N.E.2d 445, 448 (1980) (lan-
guage follows Graham rationale); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 750 (Okla. 1979);
Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 658-59 ('rex. Civ. App. 1981); DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d
44, 54, 296 N.W.2d 761, 766 (Ct. App. 1980).
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"property." It does not have an exchange value. . . on an
open market. It is personal to the holder. It terminates on the
death of the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot be as-
signed, sold, transferred, conveyed, or pledged. An advanced
degree is a cumulative product of many years of previous ed-
ucation, combined with diligence and hard work. It may not
be acquired by the mere expenditure of money. It is simply
an intellectual achievement that may potentially assist in the
future acquisition of property. In our view, it has none of the
attributes of property in the usual sense of that term.92
Seven states-Arizona, Iowa, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Texas, and Wisconsin93-have specifically adopted this language from
Graham in arriving at the conclusion that an educational degree or li-
cense to practice a profession is not a marital property asset that is di-
visible at divorce. In addition, three other states-Indiana, Kentucky,
and New Mexico 94-have arrived at the same conclusion without reli-
ance on Graham.
Courts desiring to characterize an educational degree or license as
property must "entangle [themselves] in the dialectical subtleties inher-
ent in the concept [ofl 'property.' "9 One obstacle to such characteriza-
tion has been the Graham court's traditional view of property, drawn
from Black's Law Dictionary:96 "everything that has an exchange value
or which goes to make up wealth or estate." 97 But as one judge has
pointed out, the Colorado Supreme Court did not read down far
enough among the property definitions in Black's, or if it did, it se-
lected those definitions most suited to its conservative approach to the
subject, instead of the "broad views" it claimed to follow.98 Black's
Law Dictionary contains many property definitions, including "'every
species of valuable right and interest'" and "'everything which is sub-
ject to ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visi-
ble or invisible, real or personal.' "9 The Graham court's selective
92. In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. at 432, 574 P.2d at 77.
93. See supra note 91.
94. In re Marriage of McManama, 399 N.E.2d 371, 373 (Ind. 1980); Wilcox v. Wilcox,
173 Ind. App. 661, 665, 365 N.E.2d 792, 795 (1977); Leveck v. Leveck, 614 S.W.2d 710, 712
(Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (limiting the holding of Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App.
1979); Muckleroy v. Muckleroy, 84 N.M. 14, 16, 498 P.2d 1357, 1358 (1972).
95. In re Marriage of Cropp, 5 FAM. L. Rpm. 2957, 2958 (D. Minn. 1979).
96. Black's Law Dictionary 1382 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968), citedin In re Marriage of Graham,
574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978).
97. Id
98. Lynn v. Lynn, 7 FAm. L. RPTR. at 3006.
99. Id at 3006 quoting Black's Law Dictionary (emphasis added by Lynn court). The
[Vol. 16
1983] EDUCATIONAL DEGREE AT DIVOR CE
usage of definitional language from Black's Law Dictionary is disingen-
uous and unprincipled. Even worse, the Graham conclusion concern-
ing the nature of property has caused many courts to avoid the issue or
to obscure it altogether. °°
In analyzing the property issue, courts have adopted a bewildering
array of doctrinal approaches. A majority have followed the Graham
language and declared that an educational degree is not a property as-
set. Some courts, however, have disagreed with the Graham conclusion
but have been reluctant to state forthrightly that a degree is property.
These courts carefully couch the language of their decisions to suggest
that the supporting spouse has some kind of "property interest" or
"property right" that may constitute an asset that may be divisible, or
court in Lynn noted that other less restrictive definitions in Black's Law Dictionary include
"that which is peculiar or proper to any person;" "that which belongs exclusively to one;"
"in the strict legal sense, an aggregate of rights which are guaranteed and protected by the
government;" and "the highest right a man can have to anything." The Lynn court's point is
that the Graham court's citation to Black's Law Dictionary is disingenuous.
100. Graham not only rejected the idea that an educational degree was property, but it
construed Stern v. Stern, a New Jersey case, as stating that a spouse's earning capacity, even
when enhanced by an educational degree financed by the other spouse, "should not be rec-
ognized as a separate, particular item of property." In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. at
432, 433, 574 P.2d at 77, citing Stem v. Stern, 66 N.J. 339, 331 A.2d 257 (1975). In Stern the
trial court determined that the attorney-husband's earning capacity was a separate item of
property. The Lynn court, however, said that the Graham decision misconstrued Stem
Lynn 7 FAm. L. Rpm. at 3003. Stern has been repeatedly cited as indicating that New
Jersey does not consider a professional education to be a marital asset. Yet Stern merely
refers to the attorney's earning capacity, rather than the property character of the degree. In
other words, the value of the degree can be ascertained and "is distinct from the ability of
the individual to taka that asset and develop his own earning capacity." Lynn v. Lynn, 7
FAM. L. RPTR. at 3002. The court in Lynn concluded that
It]he value of the asset should be standardized wherever applied, whereas the earn-
ing capacity of the person holding the degree or license will vary upon individual
factors and circumstances . . . . Since the concept of earning capacity is not
before this court in this respect, we can find no easy refuge in Stern.
Id A number of courts have failed to make the distinction between valuing increased earn-
ing capacity as the result of an education or license to practice, and valuing the education
itself as an asset. Taking this approach, the courts have followed the traditional method of
viewing the husband's increased earning potential as one of many factors to consider in
awarding alimony or maintenance. A typical statement of this blurring of the distinction
between the degree or education and the future earning capacity is found In re Marriage of
Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978): "However, it is the potential for increase in fu-
ture earning capacity made possible by the law degree and certificate of admission conferred
upon the husband with the aid of his wife's efforts which constitutes the asset for distribution
by the court." Id at 891; see also Lira v. Lira, 68 Ohio App. 2d 164, 167-68, 428 N.E.2d 445,
448 (1980); Diment v. Diment, 531 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975) ("It appears clear
to this court that the award of money was based upon the doctor's increase in earning capac-
ity which he acquired during the marriage."); In re Marriage of Vanet, 544 S.W.2d 236, 242
(Mo. Ct. App. 1976). See generally Note, A Property Theory of Future Earning Potential In
Dissolution Proceedings, 56 WASH. L. Rav. 277 (1981).
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at least reimbursable, at divorce.' 0 ' For example, a Minnesota court
concluded that an award to a wife who had supported her husband
through medical school "is also clearly justifiable upon the theory that
Mrs. Cropp has a limited property interest in Dr. Cropp's future earn-
ings."'1 2 In addition, a number of courts have Provided relief to the
supporting spouse without characterizing the degree as property' 0 3 or
by ignoring the property issue altogether."°4 Thus, where a court based
its award to a wife on a theory of restitution, the judge concluded that
"it is not necessary for the Court to entangle itself in the dialectical
subtleties inherent in the concept 'property.' "o105 Only a few courts
have stated directly that an educational degree is property." 6 In Lynn
v. Lynn the court held that "the medical school degree and license to
practice medicine, obtained by the plaintiff during marriage, are each
property . . . and are includable as assets subject to equitable
distribution." 07
The current state of analysis is disturbing; courts in different states
(and some courts in the same jurisdiction) arrive at contrary conclu-
sions or evade the issue completely "subject to the individual whim and
caprice of trial judges."'08 More often than not, a judge will make an
award that can only be based on the theory that the degree is property,
without saying that it is. Such evasive decision making is unprincipled
and unfair. As one exasperated judge put it, "[elither a professional
degree and/or. . license is - or is not - property.""
Modern, expanded notions of property compel the conclusion that
an educational degree should be included as a marital asset:
101. See In re Marriage of Sullivan, 127 Cal. App. 3d 656, 680, modpfed, 134 Cal. App.
3d 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1982); Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979);
Vaclav v. Vaclav, 96 Mich. App. 584, 592, 293 N.W.2d 613, 617 (1980); Moss v. Moss, 80
Mich. App. 693, 695, 264 N.W.2d 97, 98 (1978); In re Marriage of Cropp, 5 FAM. L. RPTR.
2957, 2958 (D. Minn. 1979); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 175 N.J. Super. 443, 447, 419 A.2d 1149,
1150-51 (Ch. Div. 1980).
102. In re Marriage of Cropp, 5 FAM. L. R.rR. 2957, 2958 (D. Minn. 1979).
103. See Greer v. Greer, 510 P.2d 905, 907 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973); In re Marriage of DeLa
Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 758-59 (Minn. 1981); In re Marriage of Vanet, 544 S.W.2d 236, 242-
43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Shahan v. Shahan, I FAM. L. RPTR. 2802 (Okla. Ct. App. unre-
ported decision 1975); Diment v. Diment, 531 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975); In re
Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 9, 14, 318 N.W.2d 918, 922, 924 (1982); Roberto v.
Brown, 107 Wis. 2d 22, 318 N.W.2d 358, 360 (1982).
104. See, e.g., Lowrey v. Lowrey, 633 S.W.2d 157 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
105. In re Marriage of Cropp, 5 FAM. L. RPT. at 2958.
106. See Lynn v. Lynn, 7 FAM. L. Rrm. 3001.
107. Id at 3007.
108. Id at 3006.
109. Id (emphasis added).
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It is clear that to include an educational degree and/or a pro-
fessional license in the definition of "property" would be to
take a further step into a hitherto unchartered area. But the
dynamics of the law. . . not only permit but encourage such
extraordinary expeditions so as to prevent the extraordinary
injustices which a traditional adherence to past definitions
would require. Traditional concepts of property must be
abandoned to embrace today's developmental concepts of eq-
uity, of fairness, and of equitable distribution." 0
Most courts have moved away from the limited idea that property
consists only of land, chattels, and choses in action, and have recog-
nized that the new concept of property embraces a wide array of rights
and entitlements."' In California, the concept of community property
has been greatly expanded to include many property rights and intan-
gible assets: unvested pension benefits, contingent retirement benefits,
ERISA retirement benefits, G.I. educational benefits, term insurance
110. Id In a rhetorical flourish, the court concluded with: "We should not be hesitant to
light the torch and probe into the darkest recesses of this syndrome in order to equitably
illuminate the injustices which strict adherence to traditionalist concepts would otherwise
require." Id
I 11. See general6l Oakes, "Property Rights"in ConstitutionalAnalysis Today, 56 WASH. L.
REv. 583 (1981); NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 490-97 (1978); Reich, The New Prop-
erty, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging
LegalIssues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965); Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property Adjudi-
cative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. Rnv. 445 (1977).
The United States Supreme Court gave impetus to this expanded concept of property in
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, (1974), where Justice Marshall observed: "The decisions
of this Court have given constitutional recognition to the fact that in our complex modem
society, wealth and property take many forms. We have said that property interests requir-
ing constitutional protection 'extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or
money."' Id at 207-08 (footnote omitted) (Marshall, J., dissenting). "'[T]oday more and
more of our wealth takes the form of rights or status rather than of tangible goods. . . .A
profession or job is frequently far more valuable than a house or bank account....' " Id
at 207-08 n.2 (quoting Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733, 738 (1964)); see In re
Marriage of McManama, 399 N.E.2d 371, 374 (Ind. 1980) (Hunter, J., dissenting). Justice
Hunter pointed out that the United States Supreme Court has found property interests in
tenured federal employment, welfare benefits, and possession of a driver's license.
In addition, Charles Reich has defined this concept of "new property" as follows:
[I]t must be recognized that we are becoming a society based upon relationship and
status - status deriving primarily from source of livelihood. Status is so closely
linked to personality that destruction of one may well destroy the other. Status
must therefore be surrounded with the kind of safeguards once reserved for
personality.
Reich, The New Property, at 785.
The new draft of the Uniform Marital Property Act also has adopted an expansive view
of property. The Act states that "property means a quantifiable interest, present or future,
vested or contingent, in real or personal property including income, earnings, and employee
benefit plans." UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY ACr, § 1(20) (Draft, January 1982).
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benefits, and the goodwill in a professional practice." 2 Similarly, New
Jersey has moved towards a most liberal, nonrigid view in defining
"property"," 3 which includes various pension benefits, personal injury
benefits, and workers' compensation benefits.' 14 Citing to Kruger v.
Kruger, "15 a New Jersey judge observed that "we seem to have gone
beyond strict definition, and now look to 'resources' as opposed to a
particular asset or tangible piece of property, whether real or per-
sonal."1 6 These expansive concepts of property suggest that an educa-
tional degree should also be characterized as a marital asset. In
addition, it is difficult to maintain that an educational degree or license
to practice is not a property asset, while at the same time holding that
the right to practice one's profession is a valuable property right." 7
112. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 849, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 639, 544
P.2d 561, 567 (1976) (unvested pension benefits); In re Marriage of Forrest, 97 Cal. App. 3d
850, 852, 159 Cal. Rptr. 229, 230 (1979) (contingent retirement benefits); In re Marriage of
Mantor, 104 Cal. App. 3d 981, 164 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1980) (ERISA educational benefits); In re
Marriage of Shea, Ill Cal. App. 3d 713, 717, 169 Cal. Rptr. 490, 492 (1980) (G.I. educa-
tional benefits); Biltoft v. Wootten, 96 Cal. App. 3d 58, 62, 157 Cal. Rptr. 581, 583 (1979); In
re Marriage of Mueller, 70 Cal. App. 3d 66, 137 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1977) (professional good-
will); Golden v. Golden, 270 Cal. App. 2d 401, 75 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1969) (professional
goodwill).
113. Lynn v. Lynn, 7 FAM. L. RPTR. 3001, 3002 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1980).
114. Id Lynn cites a number of cases in support of the contention that New Jersey has
taken an expanded view of the property concept. See Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219,
320 A.2d 496 (1974); Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974); Kruger v. Kruger,
73 N.J. 464, 375 A.2d 659 (1977); DiTolvo v. DiTolvo, 131 N.J. Super. 72, 328 A.2d 625
(App. Div. 1974) and Hughes v. Hughes, 132 N.J. Super. 559, 334 A.2d 379 (Ch. Div. 1975).
115. 73 N.J. 464, 375 A.2d 659 (1977). Kruger, a pension case, indicated that the financial
status of the husband and wife "may be ascertained only by marshalling the economic re-
sources of the parties," id at 468, 375 A.2d at 662, and that "[t]he right to receive monies in
the future is unquestionably such an economic resource." Id
116. Lynn v. Lynn, 7 FAM. L. RP'TR. 3001, 3002 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1980).
See generally Krauskopf, Recompensefor Financing Spouse's Education, supra note 7, at
411-16; Schaefer, I~fe Works So Husband Can Go to Law School, supra note 7, at 89-92;
Note, The Interest of the Community in a Professional Education, 10 CAL. WESTERN L. REv.,
supra note 7, at 598-602. For an interesting article concerning another intangible asset, see
Stiflleman, Community Property Interests in the Right of Publicity.- Fame and/or Fortune, 25
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1095 (1978).
117. In re Marriage of Sullivan, 127 Cal. App. 3d 656, 668-69, modfed, 134 Cal. App. 3d
634, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1982) (citing Hewitt v. Board of Medical Examiners, 148 Cal. 590,
592, 84 P. 39, 40 (1906) (right to practice medicine valuable property right); Franklin v.
Franklin, 67 Cal. App. 2d 717, 155 P.2d 637 (1945) (right to practice medicine is property
right); In re Riccardi, 182 Cal. 675, 679, 189 P. 694, 695 (1920) (right to practice law valuable
property right); Cavassa v. Off, 206 Cal. 307, 314, 274 P. 523, 526 (1929) (pharmacist's li-
cense; "The right of a person to practice the profession for which he has prepared himself is
property of the very highest character.")). Many other states have similarly recognized that
the right to practice a profession is a property right. See Wood v. Security Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 112 Neb. 66, 70, 198 N.W. 573, 575 (1924); Unger v. Landlords' Mgmt. Corp., 114 N.J.
Eq. 68, 69, 168 A. 229, 230 (1933); Muckleroy v. Muckleroy, 84 N.M. 14, 15, 498 P.2d 1357,
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A further problem with rejecting a property characterization of an
educational degree is that such nonrecognition is arbitrary in those ju-
risdictions that accord property status to the goodwill of a professional
practice.11 8 This is especially true where the goodwill of a practice has
been built by the efforts of two spouses working together; it is inconsis-
tent to say that the goodwill is an asset, while denying such status to an
educational degree that may also have been acquired through the joint
efforts of both spouses.'1 9 As one commentator has noted, "[t]he intan-
gible characteristics and difficulty in evaluation are apparently not con-
sidered obstacles in the case of goodwill. The differing result is
questionable and the logic, if any, is illusive."1 20
Certainly, the recognition of goodwill as an asset is unacceptable
under the Graham court's definition of property.' Goodwill is per-
sonal to the holder and is not inheritable - it cannot be assigned,
transferred, conveyed, or pledged. The Graham court pointed out that
an educational degree "is a cumulative product of many years of previ-
ous education, combined with diligence and hard work."' 2  The same
is true for the goodwill component of a practice. The Graham court
argued that an educational degree cannot be acquired by the mere ex-
penditure of money;' 23 the same is true for goodwill. The Graham
court concluded that a degree "is simply an intellectual achievement
that may potentially assist in the future acquisition of property."'124
One critic has argued that goodwill "is only an entry in an accounting
statement arrived at by hindsight to accommodate any amount paid or
received on transfer of a going business beyond the value attributable
1358 (1972); Roberts v. State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors, 78 N.M. 536, 538,
434 P.2d 61, 63 (1967); In The Matter of Norman Shigon and Sheldon Portner, 462.Pa. 1, 10,
329 A.2d 235, 239 (1974); Taylor v. Oklahoma, 291 P.2d 1033, 1041 (Okla. 1955); Peatross v.
Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah 1976). But see Craft
v. Balderston, 58 Idaho 650, 651-52, 78 P.2d 122, 124 (1938) (right to practice a profession is
a privilege, not a property right); Petition of Morris, 175 Mont. 456, 575 P.2d 37 (1978) (no
property right for attorney to practice his profession; is a "burdened privilege" only).
118. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce, supra note 8, at 1211; see also supra note 28.
119. Id.
120. Castleberry, Constitutional Limitations on the Division of Property upon Divorce,
supra note 7, at 58.
121. Recent Development, Graham v Graham, 13 TULSA L.J. 646, 651 (1978). The author
comments on the analogy between goodwill and educational degrees drawn by dissenting
Justice Carrigan in Grahanv "For this analogy to be valid, goodwill and an educational
degree must share similar characteristics. The dissent's goodwill analogy meets nearly all
the majority's objections in their analysis of an educational degree as property."
122. In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 432, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978).
123. Id
124. Id
19831
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to its tangible assets."''
25
Perhaps the only respect in which educational degrees and good-
will differ is that economists can calculate a present transfer value for
goodwill, whereas it is difficult to calculate such a transfer value for a
degree.' 26 Some commentators have suggested, however, that experts
can calculate a present exchange value of a professional degree, as-
sessed in terms of future earning potential. 27  Goodwill is not some-
thing that can be sold independently, but rather is an inseparable
element of the profession to which it is attached, and it is ascertainable
only by actually selling the business.' 28 Yet, when a court determines
that the goodwill of a spouse's profession must be valued and distrib-
uted at divorce, it is in a sense ordering a hypothetical sale of the good-
will, for which there is no real buyer or seller.' 29 A California court of
appeal was cognizant of this problem:
While "market value" and the value for marital dissolution
purposes of "professional goodwill" may be synonymous, in
our view such value should be determined with considerable
care and caution, since it is a unique situation in which the
continuing practitioner is judicially forced to buy an intangi-
ble asset at a judicially determined value and compelled to
pay a former spouse her share in tangible assets.'
30
125. Lurvey, Professional Goodwill on Marital Dissolution: Is It Property or 4nother Name
forAlimonyZ 52 CAL. ST. B.J. 27, 30 (1977).
126. Recent Developments, Graham v. Graham, supra note 121.
127. See Brigner, I Put Him Through School, supra note 7, at 43-44; Greene, Dissolution
of the "Educational Parnershp"Marriage, supra note 7, at 296; Kenderdine, Contributions to
Spouses's Education, supra note 7, at 426-430; Schaefer, The Interest of the Community in a
Professional Education, supra note 7, at 602-1 1; Note, A Property Theory of Future Earning
Potential in Dissolution Proceedings, supra note 7, at 286; Note, Professional Education as a
Divisible Asset in Marriage Dissolutions, supra note 7, at 713-15; Recent Case, Divorce After
Professional School, supra note 7, at 501 n. 48.
128. Lurvey, supra note 125, at 29-30.
129. Id
130. In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 110, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 68 (1974). The
Lopez decision, in arriving at its conclusion, quotes extensively from Professor Bedford of
the University of Illinois on the economic sense of goodwill, as opposed to legal or account-
ing contexts. This analysis applies equally to an educational degree:
It seems to be well established in the literature of economics that the economic
value of any asset depends on the future net receipts that the asset will produce.
While these receipts to a consumer are receipts of satisfactions, to a business firm
the receipts are cash or cash equivalent (more broadly, purchasing power
equivalent). Since the future is unknown, diferent individuals and business entities
will have dferent expectations as to what these future receipts will be. Thus, there is
no certainty in any one valuation of an asset. To the contrary, a considerable amount
of uncertainty attaches to any valuation. But subject to this variability, the conceptual
view of the economic value of any asset is based on thefuture receipts which the asset
willproduce. Because individual assets are not used in isolation but as a part of an
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A very similar problem exists in calculating the value of an educa-
tional degree. Ultimately, it is unprincipled for courts to characterize
goodwill as a "tangible, non-speculative market-determined asset"
131
while at the same time denying such property status to an educational
degree. At best goodwill is also an intangible asset: "[i]t is also amor-
phous, ephemeral, elusive, and, by general definition, speculative and
uncertain except to the extent it has already been established by an
arms-length bargaining in the open market place." 132 Both goodwill
and educational degrees should be recognized as intangible property
assets, capable of valuation upon divorce.
IV. CALCULATION OF THE VALUE OF THE SUPPORTING
SPOUSE'S CONTRIBUTIONS OR THE PRESENT VALUE
OF THE DEGREE
A California court of appeal, in Todd v. Todd, 133 concluded that:
"[education] manifestly is of such a character that a monetary value for
division with the other spouse cannot be placed upon it. . . .At best,
education is an intangible property right, the value of which, because of
organized entity containing a variety of distinct assets, the economic concept of
goodwill is introduced when the future receipts of the organization cannot be as-
signed as a contribution of a finite list of specific assets. That is, the search to
assign a specific cause, in the form of a specific asset, for the expected future re-
ceipts requires the introduction of goodwill as an asset.
Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d at 108, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 67 (emphasis added by court) (quoting
Bedford, Handbook of Modern Accounting (1970), ch. 19, at 19-5).
131. Lurvey, supra note 125, at 30. Lurvey notes that the conventional view of goodwill
was that it could exist only in a commercial trade or business, but not in a professional
practice that depended on the personal skill and reputation of the practitioner. In some
states, such as Colorado, this view has changed and the courts have now recognized that
professional practices that can be sold for more than their fixtures and accounts receivable
have saleable goodwill:
A professional, like any entrepreneur who has established a reputation for skill and
expertise, can expect his patrons to return to him, to speak well of him, and upon
selling his practice, can expect that many will accept the buyer and will utilize his
professional expertise. These expectations are a part of goodwill, and they have a
pecuniary value.
In re Marriage of Nichols, 43 Colo. App. 383, 385, 606 P.2d 1314, 1315 (1980); see also In re
Marriage of Fleege, 91 Wash. 2d 324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979); In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal.
App. 3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1974); In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 49 (1974); Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 301 P.2d 90 (1956); Hurley v.
Hurley, 94 N.M. 641, 615 P.2d 256 (1980) (overruled on other grounds in Ellsworth v. Ells-
worth, 97 N.M. 133, 637 P.2d 564 (1981)); In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wash. App. 481, 558
P.2d 279 (1976). But see Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972) (goodwill of husband's
medical practice not property asset subject to division at divorce); Holbrook v. Holbrook,
103 Wis. 2d 327, 309 N.W.2d 343 (1981) (goodwill of law partnership not a marital asset
subject to division at divorce).
132. Lurvey, supra note 125, at 30.
133. Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969).
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its character, cannot have a monetary value placed upon it for division
between spouses."'
134
The California court was correct in both respects: an educational
degree is an intangible property right, and courts cannot place a mone-
tary value on it. The best solution in educational degree cases is for
judges to recognize that education is a marital asset and to give up
attempts at valuing the degree in monetary terms. In many jurisdic-
tions, judges equivocate on the property issue to the detriment of many
supporting spouses. Even more unsettling is the resolution of the valu-
ation problem. Awards based on valuation formulas have been arbi-
trary and speculative; any attempt to value the degree in monetary
terms ultimately will be speculative and unfair. In order to achieve an
equitable settlement, judges must recognize that the educational asset
can only be valued in nonmonetary terms.
Generally, the courts have taken one of the three approaches to
valuation: (1) they have indicated it is possible to value the degree or
spouse's contributions, but have not indicated how to make this calcu-
lation;135 (2) they have actually made some calculation of the value of
the degree;" 6 or (3) they have made a calculation of the spouse's con-
tributions for the purpose of restitutionary award.137 These various ap-
proaches will be analyzed below to illustrate how the courts have
grappled with the valuation problem. In addition, a number of com-
mentators have proposed methods of valuing the worth of a degree or
license.' 38 These proposals also will be examined below to assess their
feasibility for utilization in educational degree cases.
134. Id at 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 134, 135.
135. Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (Ct. App. 1981); In re Marriage of
Sullivan, 127 Cal. App. 3d 656,modpfed, 134 Cal. App. 3d 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1982); In
re Marriage of McManama, 399 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 1980); In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263
N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Lynn v. Lynn, 7 FAM. L. RPTR. 3001 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1980).
136. In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978); Reen v. Reen, 8 FAM.
L. Rpr. 1053 (Mass. P. and Family Ct. 1981); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d 233, 452
N.Y.S.2d 801 (1982); Lira v. Lira, 68 Ohio App. 2d 164, 428 N.E.2d 445 (1980); Daniels v.
Daniels, 20 Ohio Op. 2d 460, 185 N.E.2d 773 (1961); In re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis.
2d 1, 14, 318 N.W.2d 918, 924 (1982); DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761 (Ct.
App. 1980).
137. Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); In re Marriage of DeLa Rosa,
309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979).
138. See Brigner, I Put Him Through School, supra note 7, at 43-44; Erickson, Spousal
Support Towards the Realization of Educational Goals, supra, note 7, at 971-77; Kenderdine,
Contributions to Spouse's Education, supra note 7, at 438-43; Kiker, Valuing the Spouses'
Contributions to the Marriage, supra note 7, at 50; and Comment, The Interest ofthe Commu-
nity in a Professional Education, supra note 7, at 602-11.
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A. Approaches By The Courts To The Valuation Problem
Justices in at least two courts have indicated that in educational
degree cases the value of the education can be ascertained, although
these courts have not detailed precisely how this calculation is to be
accomplished. In In re Marriage of McManama, " a dissenting justice
argued that the husband's legal degree was an intangible asset to be
considered in the property division. The justice indicated, without fur-
ther elaboration, that in order to determine the value of the degree as
an asset it was not necessary to consider future earnings; the court
could "look to the amount of money expended in achieving the degree
and use that as a basis for determining its present value as a marital
asset." 14o
The Iowa Supreme Court made a similarly vague suggestion for
valuation in In re Marriage of Horstmann. 141 There the court held that
the husband's potential increased future earning capacity as a lawyer,
made possible by his wife's contributions to the marriage, constituted
an asset for distribution. The husband argued, on appeal, that his wife
had not established the market value of this increased earning capacity.
The supreme court rejected this argument, noting that the husband
himself had introduced evidence showing that his education had cost at
least $14,000. This evidence, the court said, established the cost of the
education. "While there are, of course, other methods that could have
been used to establish the value of respondent's education, there is
nothing incorrect about the approach used here."' 42 The divorce court
awarded the wife an $18,000 property distribution, which the supreme
court upheld. 43 The Horstmann court left unanswered what other pos-
139. In re Marriage of McManama, 399 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 1980) (Hunter, J., dissenting).
The justice considered the degree to be an intangible asset "in the nature of an equitable
debt extended and expended by the wife to the husband during coverture .... " Id at 374.
140. Id This is basically what the economists and commentators call the "cost value"
approach to measuring the present worth of the degree. It is a method of valuation that
takes into account only the acquisition costs of achieving the degree, and it does not afford
the supporting spouse any measure of return on his or her investment in the other spouse's
education. The court developed this economic theory of the value of the education: "The
economic reality is clear that the degree was acquired through the expenditure of time and
money on the part of both parties. Had the money spent for the degree bought tangible
goods there is no doubt that the trial court had the power to divide those goods." Id; see
also the discussion of the "cost value" method of calculation in infra Section III B.
141. In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Iowa 1978).
142. Id The husband in Horstmann argued that his wife did not introduce evidence
concerning the value of the education because either it was not available; or if it was avail-
able, it was iot reliable. The court rejected this contention. Id
143. Id One commentator has noted that the Horstmann court's ultimate award is mud-
dled and "presents a paradox of theory and method. There the court talked of potential
1983]
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sible methods of valuation might have been utilized, and the approach
it took really did not value the asset it said was the touchstone for dis-
tribution - i.e., the husband's increased earning capacity. Both the
dissent in McManama and the Horstmann court looked narrowly to the
dollar cost of the education to supply some valuation to the asset, a
valuation method economists call "cost value" approach.
Two other courts, agreeing that an educational degree (or spouse's
interest in that degree) can be valued, have been a bit more specific
about how to value the asset, without actually doing a calculation for
the facts under consideration. In Lynn v. Lynn, '" where the court held
that a medical school degree and license to practice are each property
under New Jersey law, the court pointed out that courts often have to
establish the present value of future interests - and do so by applying
the economic theory of discounting. The wife in Lynn used a financial
expert who "testified to the capitalized, discounted value of the differ-
ential in the earning capacity of a male with a four-year college degree
and a specialist in internal medicine, that capitalized, discounted differ-
ence being the value of the medical education and license received."'
' 45
There is no indication in the opinion, however, what value this calcula-
tion yielded.
A California court of appeal in In re Marriage of Sullivan 46 pro-
posed at least three different methods of valuing a spouse's interest in
an educational degree. One method was to compare the professional
license holder's income, within a reasonable time after acquiring the
license, to the income of that person shortly before he had acquired the
license. 47 A second method was to calculate the exact amount of com-
earning capacity and the need to provide the wife with some attainment for her loss of
expectations, but apparently then proceeded to use restitution as the method of assessment
... . Nowhere in Horstrmann is there attempted a valuation of [the husband's] potential
earning capacity; only a muddled analysis of family expenses and educational costs is
presented." Recent Case, Divorce After Professional School, supra note 7, at 336-37; see also
Note, Professional Education as a Divisible Asset in Marriage Dissolutions, supra note 7;
Grosman, Identifcation Valuation of Assets Subject Equitable Distribution, supra note 7, at
216 (discussion of In re Marriage of McManama).
144. Lynn v. Lynn, 7 FAm. L. RiTR. 3001 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1980).
145. Id at 3007. The husband introduced neither an economist nor a financial expert on
his own behalf. The method of valuation used by the wife's expert was basically a simplified
version of the "income capacity value" approach, which is discussed infra Section III B.
This is a method of valuation which seeks to recompense the supporting spouse by giving
him or her some return on the investment in the other spouse's education.
146. In re Marriage of Sullivan, 127 Cal. App. 3d 656, 682, mod#Fed, 134 Cal. App. 634,
184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1982).
147. 127 Cal. App. 3d at 682-83. By way of illustration, the Sullivan court explained that a
comparison could be made between the salary of a student law clerk before the bar exam,
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munity funds and hours of labor to determine the community interest
in the education, degree, or license. A third possible method was to
determine the lost income to the community while one spouse attended
school instead of remaining employed at some position for which he
was qualified.148 In addition, the Sullivan court suggested that an anal-
ogy for valuation might be found in those cases that allocated a fair
return, to the separate and community interest, of labor expended by
one spouse in improving his separate property or business.14 9 The
problems with the Lynn court's approach (the discount method) will be
discussed below. 150 The problems with the Sullivan court's proposals
seem obvious: it is difficult to assess what is being valued and what is
being recompensed.
In other cases the courts have valued the education, but the re-
ported opinions give no indication of the method of valuation. For
example, in Reen v. Reen, 5 a Massachusetts court held that a hus-
band's license to practice orthodontia was a marital asset and valued
the husband's degree at $800,000. The court stated that the wife was
entitled to share in this value because she had put her husband through
dental school and post-graduate orthodontic training.' 52 Similarly, a
New York trial court awarded a wife forty percent of the value of her
husband's medical degree, which the court estimated to be $472,000,
given the husband's age and what he could expect to earn compared
and his salary as an attorney after he passes the exam and is in practice. Similar comparisons
are made for student nurses and student accountants. The court does not explain what this
differential signifies, and in what way it is a measure of the economic value for the educa-
tional degree. One can think of many examples where post-graduation employment would
not be an accurate measure of either current or potential value of the degree - for example,
the Harvard J.D., top 5% of his or her class, who joins a public defender's office at low
salary.
148. Id at 683. The Sullivan court is extremely vague about how these calculations
would be made, and what costs would be factored into the valuations. Taken together, the
two proposals resemble a "cost value" computation that also takes into account the so-called
"opportunity costs" of the spouse who is attending school. See infra Section III, B; Schaefer,
The Interest of the Community in a Professional Education, supra note 7, at 602-03. As indi-
cated insupra note 140, the cost value approach does not account for a return on investment
in future earning capacity.
149. 127 Cal. App. 3d at 681. The apportionment of separate and community interests in
income and profits from a separate business are determined by one of two methods of valua-
tion in California. These are the so-called Van Camp method and Pereira method. See
Beam v. Bank of America, 6 Cal. 3d 12, 17-24, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137, 139-45, 490 P.2d 257, 260-
65 (1971); Van Camp v. Van Camp, 53 Cal. App. 17, 199 P. 885 (1921); Pereira v. Pereira,
156 Cal. 1, 7, 103 P. 488, 491 (1909).
150. See infra Section III, B, and accompanying notes.
151. Reen v. Reen, 8 FAM. L. RPTR. 1053 (Mass. P. & Fain. Ct. 1981).
152. Id
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with a college graduate without a medical degree. 5 ' And in Dewitt v.
Dewitt, ' the trial court held that the husband's law degree had a value
of "not less than $14,316" - a finding rejected on appeal because there
was no evidence in the record to support this, or any other amount. 155
In these cases the court did not clearly articulate the formula used to
calculate these sums. These decisions, which place a value on educa-
tional degrees without explanation or support, are not useful in guiding
other courts t9 an equitable distribution of assets.
While some decisions merely designate the dollar value of the de-
gree, other opinions have indicated how the trial or appellate courts
have made their calculations. For example, in Daniels v. Daniels, 156 a
somewhat crude valuation attempt was based on statistical information
from the World Almanac. Testimony indicated that a United States
physician could expect to earn approximately $15,000 annually and a
specialist $18,000 annually. On appeal the husband contested this testi-
mony as incompetent, and the appellate court noted: "[A]lthough it [is]
clearly hearsay and of questionable value, it seems doubtful that said
testimony, considered in its entirety, added anything to the common
knowledge and experience of the trial court so as to materially affect
the outcome of this case."
157
A more sophisticated approach to valuation was employed in Lira
153. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d 233,452 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1982). The court in O'Brien
held that the license was marital property subject to equitable distribution. The court found
that the wife's contribution to the marriage amounted to $103,390 and that she was entitled
to 40% of the value of her husband's degree. The court awarded her $188,800.
154. 98 Wis. 2d 44, 56-57, 296 N.W.2d 761, 767 (Ct. App. 1980). The court indicated that
the wife was probably entitled to some kind of recompense from the standpoint of equity.
The court went on to say: "We cannot agree, however, that equity is served by attempting to
place a dollar value on something so intangible as a professional education, degree, or fi-
cense. The difficulties inherent in that attempt are illustrated by this case." The DeWitt
court also rejected the "cost approach" method of valuing a degree because this approach
presumes that the value of the degree is the amount of money spent acquiring it - which
the court called an unwarranted presumption. Moreover, the cost approach also "fails to
consider the scholastic'efforts and acumen of the degree holder, which may well have a
bearing on the income yielding potential of the education." Id at 57, 296 N.W.2d at 767.
Finally, the court noted that other formulas had been proposed for valuation, but the court
dismissed these proposals as being "wholly speculative." Id at 58, 296 N.W.2d at 768. See
Schaefer, W4ife Works So Husband Can Go To Law School, supra note 7, at 85; Erickson,
Spousal Support Toward Realization of Educational Goals, supra note 7, at 947; Note, 11
CoN. L. Rnv., supra note 7, at 62; Note, 13 TULSA L.J., supra note 7, at 646.
155. Dewitt v. Dewitt, 98 Wis. 2d at 57, 296 N.W.2d at 767.
156. 20 Ohio Op. 2d 458, 185 N.E.2d 773 (1961). The "expert" who was called to testify
concerning the value of the education was the wife's mother, who had an extensive back-
ground in the educational field. Id at 460, 185 N.E.2d at 775.
157. Id For a discussion of the Daniels case, see Note, ProfessionalEducation as a Divsi-
ble Asset in Marriage Dissolutions, supra note 7, at 710-11.
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v. Lira, 158 where the wife used an expert witness to establish a present
value for her husband's medical license of $863,702. The expert used
statistics from the Department of Labor, the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, the American Medical Association, and the
Medical Economics Corporation to project the husband's future earn-
ings as an internist. The expert then subtracted the income the hus-
band would have earned as a pharmacist (his prior occupation), and
discounted the difference by six percent. From this figure the expert
subtracted the husband's educational expenses.' 59 The appellate court
nonetheless rejected the wife's claim that her husband's medical license
was a marital asset, holding that it was only one factor to be considered
in an award of alimony.'60
Perhaps the most detailed attempt at valuation is found in In re
Marriage of Lundberg, 6 where the wife's expert, an economist, used
two methods to value the wife's "investment." The first method - the
discount method - was suggested in the Lynn decision. The econo-
mist compared the average earnings of physicians with those of college
graduates to establish a difference off $24,976 per year. Over a twenty-
five year period, this difference totalled $624,400. The economist then
discounted the figure by both a ten and twelve percent rate, and de-
ducted the husband's foregone earnings while he attended medical
school. Thus, the expert established that the net present value of the
husband's additional income would be between $110,837 and
$132,402.162 The second valuation method focused on the amount of
support the wife contributed while her husband was in medical school.
This was determined to be $25,510 which, if she had invested this
amount at a five percent rate of return, would have realized $33,077 163
The trial court awarded her $25,000 as compensation for her support,
158. 68 Ohio App. 2d 164, 168, 428 N.E.2d 445, 447 (1980).
159. Id at 165 n.1, 428 N.E.2d at 447 n.l.
160. Id at 168-69, 428 N.E.2d at 448. Basically the court adopted the Graham court's
definition in arriving at its conclusion; it observed that a medical license cannot be assigned,
sold, transferred, pledged, or devised. For good measure, the court also noted that at the
time of the trial, the husband had not yet formulated any substantive future employment
plans - clearly a factor that would complicate the court's valuation of the medical license
were the court to adopt an "income capacity" approach.
161. 107 Wis. 2d 1, 5, 318 N.W.2d 918, 920 (1982).
162. Id The economic analyst also deducted the additional taxes that the husband would
owe as a result of the two different discount figures that were used. "The trial court found
that these present value figures were established by credible economic evidence." Id
163. Id This approach is basically a "cost value" approach, although it did not take into
account the husband's so-called "opportunity costs" while he attended school. See infra
Section III, B, for a "cost value" method.
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phrasing the award in terms of maintenance." The appellate court
upheld this award.1
65
Finally, other courts have also developed formulas to guide judges
in calculating restitutionary awards to spouses who have supported
their spouses through school. For example, in In re Marriage of De La
Rosa, 166 the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in making a restitutionary award to a wife who
had supported her husband through college and medical school. The
supreme court disagreed with the trial court's method of calculation,
however, and indicated that the wife should receive an award to com-
pensate her only for contributions to her husband's direct educational
costs. 167 Accordingly, the wife's own living expenses had to be sub-
tracted from her earnings. The supreme court set forth its version of
the proper formula:
working spouse's financial contributions to joint living ex-
penses and educational costs of student spouse
less
1/2 (working spouse's financial contribution plus student
spouse's financial contributions less cost of education)
equals
equitable award to working spouse.'
68
Utilizing this formula, the court determined that the wife was enti-
tled to $11,400 as opposed to the trial court's award of $29,699.169
164. Id The trial court stated that "there is ample equitable justification for the $25,000
award as maintenance. . . . But whether it is called maintenance or property division, the
amount of this award is fair." From the result the court appears to have recompensed the
wife for the "cost value" of the degree.
165. Id at 12,318 N.W.2d at 923. In interpreting Wisconsin law, the court indicated that
it "view[ed] maintenance as a flexible tool available to the trial court to ensure a fair and
equitable determination in each individual case." Id
166. 309 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Minn. 1981). The court indicated the formula the trial court
used in awarding the wife $29,669:
Wife's financial contribution to the community fund during college and medical
school ($41,000)
less
Husband's financial contribution to the community fund during college and medi-
cal school, excluding student loans and grants -($11,331)
restitutionary award to the wife. equals9,9
Id at 757 n.4.
167. Id at 759. The wife had argued that her husband's increased earning capacity was a
marital asset and she called an expert who valued the medical education at $246,478. See id
at n.7.
168. Id at 759.
169. Id Footnote 9 explains the Minnesota Supreme Court's calculation as follows:
$41,000 (wife's financial contributions) - x [$41,000 (wife's financial contributions) +
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A similar but less sophisticated method of valuation was proposed
in Inman v. Inman, 170 where the court also agreed that the supporting
spouse should be compensated only for direct educational costs. The
court indicated that the proper formula for the award would take into
account "the amount spent for direct support and school expenses dur-
ing the period of education, plus reasonable interest and adjustments
for inflation."' 71 The court remanded the case for a calculation of the
wife's "present value of her interest" in conformity with those
guidelines.
1 72
The different approaches to the valuation problem and the varied
awards to spouses suggest the difficulties inherent in this task. In some
cases it is unclear what is being valued: the contributing spouse's sup-
port, the current market value of the degree or education, or the future
potential earning capacity of the license holder. In those jurisdictions
which hold that the supporting spouse should be compensated for di-
rect educational costs only, this calculation provides the supporting
spouse with no return on his or her investment - an unfair result. This
calculation also assumes that the only contributions are monetary,
which is unrealistic, especially in community property states. Those
jurisdictions that utilize the economists' "discount" method of calcula-
$2,300 (husband's earnings) + $9,031 (husband's veterans' benefits) + $5,680 (husband's
medical school grant) + $ 10,000 (husband's student loans) - $8,8 10 (husband's undergradu-
ate tuition and medical school costs)] = $11,400. This is basically a cost value approach that
incorporates many variables, and has the merit of imputing one-half of the living expenses
and all the educational expenses to the student spouse. It fails to take into account, however,
the opportunity costs of the student spouse. See infra Section III, B, for a discussion of the
"cost value" method. Dissenting Justice Todd agreed that the trial court had the discretion-
ary power to make an equitable award, but did not believe "it [was] necessary to cast the
relief granted in a mathematical formula." He would have affirmed the trial court award of
$29,669 to the wife. See supra note 166.
170. 578 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). The court suggested that the "spouse's
interest in such a degree should be measured by his or her monetary investment in the
degree, but not equivalent to recovery in quasi-contract to prevent unjust enrichment." Id
at 269.
171. Id This basic formula was also adopted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Hub-
bard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 752 (Okla. 1979), and criticized by the Court of Appeals in
DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 57, 296 N.W.2d 761, 767 (Ct. App. 1980). Again, this
formula is a cost value approach that does not take into consideration the opportunity costs
of the student spouse. See infra Section III, B, for a discussion of the "cost value" method.
172. Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d at 270. For commentary and criticism of the Inman
decision, see Note, Intangible Educational and Professional Attainments as Divisible Marital
Property, supra note 7; Mazanec, The Inman Case, supra note 7. For commentary on the
Hubbard case, see generally Note, Recognition of Wfe s Interest in a Professional Degree
Earned by a Husband During Marriage, supra note 7; Recent Development, he Effect of a
Spouse's Professional Degree on a Division of Marital Property andAward ofAlimony, supra
note 7.
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tion inevitably must engage in a great deal of speculation: not aU med-
ical, law, or graduate degrees will earn the average statistical value.
For example, a student in the top ten percent of his or her law class at
Harvard could command a high Wall Street salary upon graduation,
but may choose instead to be a lower-paid public defender. Is the sup-
porting spouse entitled to a property settlement that forces the new law-
yer to work on Wall Street and give up his or her public defender's job
in order to meet the earnings of the statistically average lawyer?
Moreover, the discount method does not always consider the many
variables that can affect the value of a particular education, such as a
desire to pursue or continue employment in the field, market opportu-
nities, premature death, and so on. The discount method is also falla-
cious in its comparison of the professional's degree to that of an
average four-year college degree. Most students who pursue further
professional education are drawn from the top of their college classes,
and so to compare their ultimate professional degree to that of average
graduates is to distort income averages and income disparities.
Furthermore, none of the approaches utilized by the courts have
factored in the so-called "opportunity costs' 173 to the supporting
spouse: the value of foregone training or education, as well as career
advancement, to the spouse who worked while the other spouse's pros-
pects are improved through additional schooling. All these problems
and variables indicate that although courts are trying to reach fair set-
tlements in educational degree cases, the actual relief awarded is quite
unfair and inequitable. As will be discussed below 174 courts should
give up the attempt to value an educational degree in monetary terms.
Fair awards can be made to both spouses based on another, nonmone-
tary theory of value. Until judges stop trying to assign a dollar value to
educational degrees, awards in these cases will continue to be arbitrary
and unfair.
B. Proposed Methods Of Valuation By Commentators
A number of commentators have agreed with the courts that al-
though an educational degree is difficult to value, it is possible to make
such calculations. The proposed methods of valuation, however, are as
problematic as the approaches used by some courts. While the pro-
posed formulas are interesting from the economist's or statistician's
perspective, ultimately these proposals are unworkable and cannot
173. See infra Section III, B, for a discussion of opportunity costs.
174. See infra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
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guide trial-level divorce judges to an equitable settlement in educa-
tional degree cases.
175
One proposed method of valuation is based on the "cost value"
theory.17 6 This theory takes into account two different components of
the cost to the couple of acquiring the degree: the direct purchase
price, plus the so-called "opportunity cost" of the education. The di-
rect purchase price consists of such items as tuition, laboratory and
library fees, and excludes any tangible purchases such as books or pa-
per, which may be evaluated separately at divorce. To the direct costs
are added indirect costs, namely, the opportunity cost of the student
spouse. 177 This is defined as the loss of potential earnings while the
student spouse is in school.178 Tax liabilities, consumption, and neces-
sary expenditures are deducted from this sum 179 so that the value of the
professional education is expressed as:
Direct Purchase Cost
plus
Opportunity Cost
equals
175. See supra note 138. Proposed remedies by three commentators will not be discussed
extensively here. Brigner suggested that it is possible to award future earnings and that the
calculation of this share would be similar to any "future-value" issue. He indicated that
expert testimony is available for proof and that several mathematical formulas are available
to determine each spouse's contributions and what the degree can generate in the future. He
did not explain these mathematical formulas. See Brigner, IPut Him Through School, supra
note 7, at 43-44. Kiker suggested a method for evaluating a wife's foregone training and
learning opportunities, which might be tangentially relevant to a valuation of an education's
worth. See Kiker, Valuing the Spouse's Contributions, supra note 7, at 50.
Erickson would add a new provision to the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act dealing
exclusively with "educational debts." She would value the spouses' contributions by includ-
ing tuition, fees, books, supplies, living expenses, research, and tutorial or clerical assistance,
housework, and maintenance of the home and family in excess of the contributing spouse's
equitable share, and any other reasonable contribution. At the federal level, she proposes
that the Bankruptcy Act be revised to provide that the spousal educational debt would not
be dischargeable in bankruptcy. See Erickson, Spousal Support, supra note 7, at 971-77.
176. Schaefer, The Interest of the Community in a Professional Education, supra note 7, at
603.
177. Id
178. Id Schaefer's article notes that the Association of Appraisers of Earning Capacity
in Berkeley, California, provides a consulting service that can calculate the value of cost
opportunity. The calculation takes into account the age, race, sex, education, occupation or
profession, and earning history of the student spouse prior to attending professional school.
The "cost opportunity" calculation is essentially a valuation of lost earnings. Id at 603 n.76.
For another discussion of cost opportunity, see Krauskopf, Recompense For Financing
Spouse'r Education, supra note 7, at 384.
179. Schaefer, The Interest of the Community in a Professional Education, supra note 7, at
603. Schaefer gives no indication of what these three items represent, or how they would be
calculated.
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Cost Value of Education 80
The proposed cost theory is a variation of the method now used by
some courts,' 8' except that it takes into account the opportunity cost of
the student spouse as a component of valuation. The formula does not
take into account, however, potential earning power generated by the
degree, and it therefore is a measure, not of its value in a prospective
sense, but only in terms of the cost of its acquisition. For those jurisdic-
tions which view the marital relationship from an investment stand-
point, the cost value theory affords the supporting spouse no return on
his or her investment. Most importantly, the measure of opportunity
cost is inadequate because it fails to measure the foregone opportunity
of the supporting spouse to attend school.
Another proposed method of valuation attempts to establish the
worth of this future earning potential; it has been called the "income
capacity value."'18 2 Basically, this formula calculates the spouse's in-
come with a professional education, less that person's income without
the professional education, and the result is multiplied by a sliding
fraction to adjust over time for years of skill and experience. 83 The
180. Id
181. See, e.g., Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); In re Marriage
of DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 757 (Minn. 1981); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 752
(Okla. 1979); In re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 5, 318 N.W.2d 918, 920 (1982).
For a criticism of the cost value approach, see DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 57, 296
N.W.2d 761, 767 (Ct. App. 1980).
182. Schaefer, The Interest of the Community in a Professional Education, supra note 7, at
604-11.
183. Id. Schaefer suggests that there is precedent for this type of calculation in wrongful
death and brain injury cases, where the courts have been willing to consider the future worth
of an education over the worth of its cost. This analogy to tort law is also made in Kraus-
kopf, Recompense For FinancingA Spouse's Education, supra note 7, at 388-89. The problem
with the tort analogy is that in such cases the awards are based on a theory of fault or
wrongdoing on the part of the tortfeasor, which allows judge and jury to engage in an other-
wise speculative calculation of future earnings. It is questionable whether such an analogy is
suitable in the dissolution context, where almost all states have abandoned fault as a basis
for divorce. See Freed and Foster, Divorce In The Ffty States, supra note 8, at 241-45.
According to Freed and Foster, only Illinois and South Dakota have some fault grounds for
divorce; all other jurisdictions now have some kind of "no-fault" divorce.
The tort analogy is also problematic because it involves a situation where the wage
earner has died or is incapacitated, whereas in educational degree cases the professional
continues to work in the future. Surely the professional's future earnings are based only in
part on the degree; some part of his earnings are due to increased skill and experience. Even
if it were possible to estimate future earnings with certainty, it does not follow that it would
be possible to allocate those future earnings among a professional degree, a college degree, a
high school degree, ambition, hard work, astute career choices, and luck.
Schaefer's sliding fraction proposal helps account for that portion of future income that
is solely attributable to skill and experience as the professional develops his career. It is,
however, an extremely rough approximation, at best.
1983] EDUCATIONAL DEGREE AT DIVORCE
sliding fraction is calculated by the ratio of:
Number of Years of Professional Education
divided by
Number of Years Since Professional Education
Commenced
84
and the formula for determining the income capacity value is then ex-
pressed as:
Income With Professional Education
minus
Income Without Professional Education
multiolied by
The Sliding Fraction185
The author of this proposal recognizes that there are problems
with this approach; it is speculative in that it does not allow for unfore-
seeable occurrences, such as premature death, the cyclical nature of the
market economy, employment disqualification, and personal decisions
(such as foregoing employment or pursuing employment in a less
financially lucrative, but perhaps more socially beneficial, field)."8 6
184. Schaefer, The Interest of the Community in a Professional Education, supra note 7, at
609. Schaefer explains that at the year of graduation the numerator and denominator of this
fraction would be equal.
185. Id at 609-11. Schaefer's formula assumes that one year of professional education is,
and remains, equal in value to one year of professional practice. Schaefer illustrates the use
of his formula with the hypothetical of a person whose projected earning capacity in his first
year as an attorney is $11,000, as compared to a projected $9,000 earning capacity as a four-
year graduate. The supporting spouse's share would be calculated as: ($11,000 - $9,000)3/
= $1,500 with $1,500 as the value of the education in the first year after divorce and gradua-
tion. In community property states such as California, the wife would be entitled to one-half
this amount, or $750.00.
186. Id at 611. A very good criticism of those formulas that would value an education or
degree based on future earning capacity is found in DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 296
N.W.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1980), where the court objected to the "wholly speculative" nature of
such calculations:
Whether a professional education is and will be of future value to its recipient is a
matter resting on factors which are at best difficult to anticipate or measure. A
person qualified by education for a given profession may choose not to practice it,
may fail at it, or may practice in a specialty, location, or manner which generates
less than the average income enjoyed by fellow professionals. The potential worth
of the education may never be realized for these or many other reasons. An award
based upon the prediction of the degree holder's success at the chosen field may
bear no relationship to the reality he or she faces after divorce. Unlike an award of
alimony, which can be adjusted after divorce to reflect unanticiapted changes in.
the parties' circumstances, a property division may not. The potential for inequity
to the failed professional or one who changes careers is at once apparent; his or
her spouse will have been awarded a share of something which never existed in a
real sense.
Id at 58, 296 N.W.2d at 768 (footnotes omitted).
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The proposed formula also tends to view all college degrees and all
professional degrees through the strainer of statistical averages, but as
many professional degree holders realize, the marketability of their de-
gree depends also on a large number of variables: geographical loca-
tion; rank in class or performance in school; area of professional
specialization; age of the degree holder at the time of admittance to the
profession; previous experience in the field. The proposed income ca-
pacity formula views all educational degree holders on the basis of na-
tional, statistical averages: a computation that is inherently inequitable
in individual cases because personal opportunities diverge so radically
from the hypothetical "average." Rather than proving to be a fair allo-
cation of return to the supporting spouse, such calculations result only
in more unjust property settlements.
Yet a third proposed formula measures not only the degree
holder's future earning potential, but also the value of the supporting
spouse's contributions in both time and money. 187 This method incor-
porates the idea that the supporting spouse has also incurred an indi-
rect cost: the time in which that spouse could have supplemented his or
her own education and future earning potential, if he or she had not
been supporting the family. The proposed formula to account for this
variable would be expressed as:
Undiscounted Total Increased Lifetime Earning Potential
divided by
Total Number of Working Years Remaining
[This fraction] mutiplied by
Percentage of Spouse's Contributions to Total Costs
(Not to Exceed 50%)
Plus
Actual Direct Costs (According to Inman Formula) 8
equals
Cost Recapture.18 9
187. Kenderdine, Contributions to Souse' Education, supra note 7, at 426. The author
suggests that Kentucky's Inman formula, a cost value formula, should be modified because
there the supporting spouse gets neither an equitable share of the degree-holder's earning
potential, nor is he or she adequately compensated for past contributions. Kenderdine ar-
gues that the supporting spouse contributes both time and money: time in which that spouse
could have supplemented his or her own education and future earning potential. Id
188. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
189. Kenderdine, Contributions to Spouse's Education, supra note 7, at 426 n.101.
Kenderdine illustrates a computation under this formula, assuming the following facts: (1) a
$250,000 increased lifetime earnings potential (undiscounted) based on (2) a thirty-five year
working life; (3) a supporting spouse who worked five years while the other spouse attended
school; (4) a supporting spouse who contributed 70% of the total family expenses, and (5)
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Rather than valuing the future earning potential of the degree
holder, this formula attempts to measure the supporting spouse's "rea-
sonable share" of the future income stream. This approach has the
merit of recognizing that the supporting spouse is probably not entitled
to an equal division of future earnings, and of recognizing that future
increased earning capacity will be enhanced by the post-graduate skills
and experience of the degree holder.190 But in the final analysis, this
formula is as problematic as the "income capacity value" approach and
involves the same speculative considerations as have been discussed.
Indeed, the formula is predicated on a large, speculative assumption -
that the degree holder's increased lifetime earning potential is measura-
ble with any degree of fairness or reliability.
Finally, a variation on the "cost value" and "income capacity"
methods is based on investment in human capital.191 According to this
approach, human capital, including skills, talents, and knowledge that
increases productivity, is a form of wealth and economists can calculate
a return on an investment in education. First, the value of the spouse's
earning capacity, before the investment in his education, is calcu-
lated. 192 Then the person's earning capacity, after the additional edu-
cation, is valued. 93 From these expected future earnings is subtracted
the "investment costs" of the additional education, such as tuition,
books, and laboratory fees, as well as opportunity costs. 194 Finally, the
pre-investment earning capacity is subtracted from post-investment
earnings, less investment costs. "The [result] is the 'profit' or amount of
return, which is the present value of the enhanced earnings attributable
whose actual contribution plus Inman would be $21,000. According to Kenderine, the sup-
porting spouse's share, under these facts, would be computed as: [($250,000 / 35 =
$7,142.85) x 5 = $35,714.50 x .5 = $17,857.13] + $21,000 = $38,857.13.
190. Id at 425.
191. Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouse's Education, supra note 7, at 381-84.
192. Id at 382-83. This is a valuation of expected earnings based on present occupation,
training, and life expectancy, and takes into account elementary, secondary, and college
education. Krauskopf explains that this calculation can be made based on data obtained
from actuarial and United States census sources. Id
193. Id at 383. This calculation would be based on the same data, but includes the addi-
tional education. Krauskopf says that a major factor for the expert to consider will be the
number of remaining productive years for the individual. Id In a footnote, she acknowl-
edges that "[tihis estimation process is subject to the limitations of using past data for a
group to determine probabilities of future return on a particular investment. Of course, risk
and uncertainty are always involved in making future projections for an individual." Id at
383 n.18.
194. Id at 384. This calculation would not include the maintenance costs of daily living
because the spouse attending school would have incurred these expenses whether in school
or not. Id
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to the investment that exceed the cost of that investment."'' 95 Once
again, this method is flawed by its reliance on speculation concerning
future income streams that are unlikely to match the estimates.
A comparison of all these proposed formulas highlights the prob-
lem inherent in attempting to value the worth of an educational degree.
Like many judges, the commentators disagree on what exactly should
be valued: the direct educational costs or the future earning potential.
In addition to that threshold issue, it is not certain what elements
should be included to calculate fairly the worth of a spouse's past con-
tributions or to value the degree holder's future potential earnings. It is
interesting to note that each different proposal utilizes different vari-
ables to calculate worth; how is a judge to determine which formula
will achieve an equitable result for the parties before him or her? In
the final analysis, none of the proposed formulas offers a workable
remedy that will both recompense the supporting spouse and fairly
treat the continuing labors. and skills of the degree holder.
V. A PROPOSED REMEDY IN EDUCATIONAL DEGREE CASES BASED
ON A LABOR THEORY OF VALUE
Ideally, a remedy should apply equitably in all cases, regardless of
the duration of the marriage or the amount of accumulated assets at the
time of divorce. More importantly, a remedy in educational degree
cases should be workable and understandable for the spouses, their at-
torneys, and the divorce court judge. It should avoid the need to rely
on expert witnesses, whose fees increase the cost of litigation without
any material advance in the fairness of the result. Complicated
econometric formulas, explained and justified by expert witnesses, will
not, in the context of divorce proceedings, serve the needs of all parties
or instill a sense of fairness or equity.
The courts are confused because they perceive that once an educa-
tional degree is construed as property or a marital asset, it must be
valued in dollar amounts, along with the house, car, and furnishings.
As indicated above, the courts have approached educational degree
cases as a two-fold problem: is the degree or license to practice prop-
erty, and if so, how should this asset be valued?196 In essence the courts
have become entangled in a dilemma of their own making, because
underlying all the attempts at valuation is the assumption that the de-
gree is an asset that is capable of being valued in conventional terms of
195. Id Krauskopf does not illustrate her proposed formula with a hypothetical case.
196. See supra Section I and accompanying notes.
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dollars and cents. Judges must recognize, however, that the Todd court
in California is basically correct in its conclusion that an education
"manifestly is of such a character that a monetary value for division
with the other spouse cannot be placed upon it."' 97
Courts should stop trying to place a monetary value on educa-
tional degrees. They have been led astray by their underlying assump-
tion that an education is a market asset capable of being valued in
monetary terms. The better approach is to recognize that there are cer-
tain nonmarket assets that cannot readily be valued in conventional
monetary terms. Such a realization does not detract from the property
character of the asset; it just recognizes that there are some assets that
cannot be valued in dollar terms. Divorce courts, sitting in equity, rec-
ognize this principle routinely in their distibution of various assets of
incalculable worth. A good example of this is the family heirloom or
the portrait of great-grandmother, which has little or no real market
value but is of great sentimental value to one of the spouses. 198 The
divorce court must distribute this asset and will do so based on its equi-
table discretionary powers, but in such situations the courts feel no ne-
cessity to assess a monetary value for the asset. An educational degree
or license is similar to such nonmarket assets; it is property, but ex-
tremely difficult to calculate in dollar or potential dollar terms.
Although an educational degree is best understood as a nonmarket
asset that is difficult to value in monetary terms, it is possible to assess
the worth of an education based on an older theory of value: the labor
theory of value. Basically, the classical economists theorized that the
value of any commodity can be expressed in terms of the labor input
required in its production.' 99 According to this view, value was some-
197. Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 134 (1969).
198. See generaly H. CLARK, Law of Domestic Relations §§ 13.1, 14.8 (1968).
199. One of the earliest exponents of the labor theory of value was Adam Smith who
wrote in 1776:
The value of any commodity, therefore, to the person who possesses it, and who
means not to use or consume it himself, but to exchange it for other commodities,
is equal to the quantity of labour which it enables him to purchase or command.
Labour, therefore, is the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodi-
ties.
The real price of every thing, what every thing really costs to the man who
wants to acquire it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring it. What every thing is
really worth to the man who has acquired it, and who wants to dispose of it or
exchange it for something else, is the toil and trouble which it can save to himself,
and which it can impose upon other people. What is bought with money or with
ds is purchased by labour as much as what we acquire by the toil of our own
by That money or those goods indeed save us this toil. They contain the value
of a certain quantity of labour which we exchange for what is supposed at the time
to contain the value of an equal quantity. Labour was the first price, the original
purchase-money that was paid for all things.
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thing independent of market fluctuations; prices might vary, but the
value of a commodity remained constant.200 This view was particularly
relevant to pre-industrial societies where most commodities were pro-
duced by individual artisans or workmen and their labor input was a
fair measure of value.20 1 A good expression of this idea that labor
value remains constant is stated in Adam Smith's The Wealth of
Nations.-
Labour, therefore, it appears evidently, is the only universal,
as well as the only accurate measure of value, or the only
standard by which we can compare the value of different
commodities at all times and all places. We cannot estimate,
it is allowed, the real value of different commodities from cen-
tury to century by the quantities of silver which were given for
them. We cannot estimate it from year to year by the quanti-
ties of corn. By the quantities of labour we can, with the
greatest accuracy, estimate it both from century to century
and from year to year.20 2
Under this view, the most accurate method of valuing the worth of
a table or a piece of pottery would be in terms of the labor of the arti-
san to produce the item, rather than the price it could command in the
A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 47-48
(Vol. 1, 1976). David Hume expressed the same idea in his essay "Of Commerce": "Every
thing in the world is purchased by labour, and our passions are the only causes of labour."
See D. HUME, Essays Moral, Political, and Literary 293 (T. Green & T. Grose eds. 1964).
David Ricardo furthered the analysis of value by examining two other inputs: land and
capital. He eliminated the factor of land from his explanation of value and concluded that
capital could be reduced to its labor inputs. See D. RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY AND TAXATION 36, 88 (Piero Scraffa ed. 1953).
John Stuart Mill basically adhered to the classical economists' labor theory of value,
but added his own insights. His explanation of the difference in the value between two com-
modities is interesting in the context of educational degrees:
If one of two things commands, on the average, a greater value than the other, the
cause must be that it requires for its production either a greater quantity of labour,
or a kind of labour paid at a higher rate; or that the capital, or part of the capital,
which supports that labour must be advanced for a longer period; or lastly, that the
production is attended with some circumstances which requires to be compensated
by a permanently higher rate of profit.
J. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 480 (W. J. Ashley ed. 1926). In the case of an
educational degree, its own value must therefore be measured by the time expended on its
acquisition; the "stored labor," or capital, used to acquire preliminary degrees should not be
attributed to the advanced degree.
200. See A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 199. "Labour alone, therefore,
never varying in its own value, is alone the ultimate and real standard by which the value of
all commodities can at all times and places be estimated and compared. It is their real price;
money is their nominal price only." Id at 5 I.
201. Id at 65-66.
202. Id at 54.
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marketplace. A table might be valued at four labor-hours by the indi-
vidual laborer.
The labor theory of value was abandoned by economists as indus-
trial society developed and the production of goods became more com-
plicated, particularly in assembly-line factories utilizing mass
production techniques. Since the production of goods now required
the labor of many persons working together, theories of value changed
to reflect the multiplicity of inputs necessary to produce a good. This
impact of industrialization on the labor theory of value was described
by Karl Marx in the mid-nineteenth century:
The introduction of power looms into England probably re-
duced by one-half the labour required to weave a given quan-
tity of yarn into cloth. The hand-loom weavers, as a matter of
fact, continued to require the same time as before: but for all
that, the product of one hour of their labour represented after
the change only half an hour's social labour, and conse-
quently fell to one-half its former value.2 °3
With the advent of industrial society economists began to focus on
theories of value as determined by market exchanges and price. The
labor theory of value, however, has never been repudiated or discred-
ited, and thus it remains the only fair way to assess the worth of a
commodity where the good being valued is fundamentally a nonmarket
asset that has been produced by the application of a single factor of
production. Fundamentally, an educational degree is solely the result
of the labor of the student spouse. Thus, the labor theory is uniquely
suitable as a measure of value in educational degree cases. Any mar-
ket-oriented measures must inevitably fail to produce a consistent re-
sult, and the objections that have led modem economists away from
the labor theory of value do not apply to these educational degree
cases.
Under the labor theory of value, the measure of the value of the
education is the labor time necessary for the production of the com-
203. Marx's analysis of value followed from the classical economists; he agreed that labor
was the source of all value and that capital consisted of accumulated labor. He argued that
the value of labor-power was established by labor inputs: 'The value of labour-power is
determined, as in the case of every other commodity, by the labour-time necessary for the
production, and consequently also the reproduction, of this special article." I K. MARx,
CAPITAL 189 (1912); see also J. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 199.
Perhaps ironically, in 1848 Mill wrote that "there is nothing in the laws of value which
remains for the present or any future writer to clear up; the theory of the subject is com-
plete." PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY at 436. This was, of course, the same year in
which Karl Marx published his Communist Manifesto.
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modity: the educational degree or the license to practice a profession.
For example, if it takes a law student three years to complete law
school and another six months to study for and pass the bar exam, then
the value of that degree is 3 1/2 years of labor time. This valuation
assumes a full-time student spouse, but the calculation can be applied
fractionally for part-time students, as well. A part-time evening law
student who takes four years to earn his or her law degree has accumu-
lated an equivalent amount of labor-input time as the full-time day
student: three years of labor time to produce the degree. Similarly, in
valuing the worth of a medical degree, the calculation would include
the time period needed to complete the training necessary to practice in
the profession. The court would count minimally the years expended
by the student spouse in medical school, and an internship and possibly
a residency, and advanced specialized training. In some cases the
worth of the education could be in excess of ten years of labor value.
Thus, the value of the educational degree as a marital asset can be
calculated by establishing the amount of time it took for the student
spouse to acquire it. This value is what the student spouse owes back to
the family at the time of divorce and is based on the theory, adhered to
in community property jurisdictions, that in marriage both partners
contribute to the family existence, although the contributions may be
financially unequal. In addition, many contributions are nonmonetary,
in the form of support services such as housekeeping and child care.
Nonetheless, the contributions of the spouses are presumed to be equal
regardless of the form they take. In this regard community property
jurisdictions are correct. Therefore, where a student spouse spends
time on earning a degree, that is time that would otherwise have been
spent on the family, contributing either financially or intangibly in
other services. At divorce, the student spouse owes the marriage the
value of the property asset, which is the amount of labor-time utilized
to acquire it.
The supporting spouse, under this theory, would thus be entitled
to one-half the value of the degree. As an equal in the marriage, the
supporting spouse is presumed to contribute to the family during the
marriage. This is true whether the other spouse attends school or not;
in either situation, the supporting spouse will work outside the home
and contribute financially or remain at home and provide support serv-
ices. In many marriages both spouses contribute financially and intan-
gibly, yet regardless of the actual amount of contribution the spouses
are treated as equal providers. Under this view, each spouse is entitled
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to one-half of all assets acquired during the marriage, in spite of actual
contributions towards the acquisition of the property.
The labor theory of value can thus be applied in all marital situa-
tions and awards each spouse one-half of the value of the degree. For
example, if the supporting spouse provides 100% of the family income
while the student spouse attends school and earns nothing, the spouses
are considered equal providers and each is entitled to one-half the
value of the asset they jointly acquire. If, on the other hand, one
spouse stays at home and watches soap operas while the other attends
law school, each would still be entitled to one-half the value of the
degree even though one spouse arguably had contributed no financial
support during this period. Likewise, if a student spouse finances his
education through loans, this financial support would neither add nor
subtract from the calculation of the worth of the degree. The value is
still calculated simply in labor-input terms, with each spouse entitled to
one-half that value notwithstanding outside support. Finally, the labor
theory can also be applied to award each spouse one-half the value of
the degree if both spouses work part-time or full-time, or any other
combination of possibilities.
How is the court to award labor time to the supporting spouse?
Under this theory of value, the supporting spouse is entitled to support,
at fifty percent of the professional spouse's actual income, for the same
period of time it took for that spouse to acquire the degree or license.2°4
In other words, the wife who supported her husband through three and
one-half years of law school is entitled, at divorce, to receive one-half
of her husband's income for the same period of time, to be paid out in
periodic payments over that time period. Alternatively, depending on
the desires of the spouses, the court could flexibly alter the award so
that the supporting spouse could receive 100% of the professional's in-
come for 1 3/4 years, 10% for 17 1/2 years, or any other combination
yielding the same product. This entitlement would be awarded without
regard to the duration of the marriage or the accumulation of other
assets. Other marital property would be distributed independent of the
award made for the value of the educational degree. Because the
award would be based on the theory that the degree was a marital
property asset, it would not run afoul of maintenance requirements in
204. The theory here is that one-half of living expenses are imputed to each spouse dur-
ing the marriage, as these are costs they would have had to incur regardless of whether one
or both spouses attended school. The wife or supporting spouse is therefore not entitled to
all the professional's income for the equivalent number of post-divorce years, because such
an award would ignore the one-half of expenses imputed to the student spouse.
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many states.2 5 Moreover, once the degree is construed as property,
community property jurisdictions could likewise effectuate such an
award.' In short, all jurisdictions could make this type of award be-
cause it would be a property distribution, and all divorce courts are
empowered to make property settlements.
This method of valuation and award has two chief virtues: (1) it is
simple to calculate and is therefore a highly workable remedy, and
(2) it is equitable and fair to both parties. The calculation of value is
simple when based on a labor theory of value: all the court need do is
to look to the labor time of the student spouse in order to determine
value. The supporting spouse, as marital partner, is then entitled to
one-half that value. This approach avoids the complexities of
econometric formulas. It avoids the speculation that is inherent in
evaluating a particular degree holder's future earning potential. It does
not require the evaluation of a multiplicity of variables; on the con-
trary, it looks solely to the input of the student spouse. It does not
necessarily require expert testimony with its attendant uncertainties
and potential unfairness, actual or perceived. Moreover, this approach
is explicit in what it is valuing: it measures the cost of the degree to the
student, rather than the value of the supporting spouse's contributions.
Thus, it is the marital asset that is being valued, rather than something
else that the court feels should be compensated.
It should also be clear that this method of valuation and award is
fair to both spouses. In essence, the supporting spouse receives what he
or she contributed towards the earning of the degree: an equivalent
amount of time in which to pursue further education or career ad-
vancement. If the supporting spouse, at divorce, chooses not to pursue
further personal development that will be the spouse's choice. More-
over, the supporting spouse will receive a return on the investment in
the student spouse: this will be realized in terms of the increased in-
come of the student spouse. Since the supporting spouse will be enti-
tled to one-half of the professional's income for an equivalent period, it
can be expected that in most cases this will result in a higher level of
support than when the student spouse was in school.
This type of award is also equitable to the student spouse who
finally begins a professional career. The award recognizes that the de-
gree is the result of the labor of the student spouse, and that future
earnings are the product not only of the education, but also the devel-
205. See supra notes 9, 41, 42 and accompanying text.
206. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Sullivan, 127 Cal. App. 3d 656, modfled, 134 Cal. App.
3d 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1982).
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opment of skills and professional experience. The award is finite and
based on the value of the degree, rather than on speculative calcula-
tions of potential earning capacity. It neither forces the professional
spouse to seek a higher paying position nor to remain in a high-income
position he or she dislikes. It allows the spouse to pay out a property
settlement over time, rather than be burdened with an onerous, one-
time, lump-sum award. In short, the professional spouse is free to pur-
sue his or her career interests without the restrictions imposed indi-
rectly by a divorce court's artificial evaluation of the economic worth of
the profession.
In 1975 a New York state court, recognizing that "times have
changed," took an innovative step in this direction in Morgan v. Mor-
gan. 207 There, the wife worked to support her husband through under-
graduate school and then law school at Columbia University. She
worked full-time as a secretary, and after the birth of their child, she
did part-time secretarial work and child care at home.208 The court
found that she was highly skilled and could earn at least $10,000 a year
as an executive secretary. The husband, after a federal judicial clerk-
ship, joined a Wall Street law firm, where at the time of trial he was
earning $27,500. The court concluded that, "[i]n all, he has done well
and his future appears very promising." 209 Shortly after the Morgans
separated, the wife began to pursue pre-medical education at the un-
dergraduate level, and she hoped to go to medical school.21 0 At their
divorce hearing, the husband contended that his wife was not entitled
to alimony, since she was capable of supporting herself.211 The court,
however, framed the issue in an interesting fashion: "[s]hall a young
mother, presently a full-time pre-medical student with exceptional
grades, be given an equal opportunity for development and fulfillment
by completing her medical school training although capable of being
207. 366 N.Y.S.2d 977, 81 Misc. 2d 616 (1975), modfied, 383 N.Y.S.2d 343, 52 App. Div.
2d 804 (1976).
208. Id. at 978-79, 81 Misc. 2d at 618.
209. Id. at 979, 81 Misc. 2d at 618. The husband's starting salary at his Wall Street firm
was $18,000. In two years, his salary was increased to $27,500.
210. Id The wife began taking pre-medical courses at Hunter College. The court noted
that she had earned a 3.83 general average and an A in organic chemistry-which ranked
her fifth in a class of seventy. Id
211. Id at 981, 81 Misc. 2d at 619. The husband's argument was based on Section 236 of
the Domestic Relations Law of New York, which directs the court to consider the ability of
the wife to be self-supporting. In construing this mandate, the trial court stated: "'Self-
supporting,'... does not imply that the wife shall be compelled to take any position that
will be available when her obvious potential in life, in terms of 'self-support' will be greatly
inhibited." Id, 81 Misc. 2d at 620.
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self-supporting as a secretary?. ' 21 2
The court concluded that she was entitled to an alimony award
and noted "she merely seeks for herself the same opportunity which she
helped to give the defendant. ' 211 The husband was ordered to pay
weekly alimony until the wife completed her medical studies.214 The
court stated that, in its opinion,
the answer to this issue is that under these circumstances, the
wife is also entitled to equal treatment and a "break" and
should not be automatically relegated to a life of being a well-
paid, skilled technician laboring with a life-long frustration as
to what her future might have been as a doctor, but for her
marriage and motherhood.215
Unfortunately, the court's award was overturned on appeal.21 6 The ap-
pellate court found that "[a]lthough the wife's ambition is most com-
mendable," the trial court was in error "in including in the alimony
award monies for the achievement of that goal."2 7
The Morgan case is significant because it is one of the few in-
stances where a court based an award, in an educational degree case,
on the theory of providing the supporting spouse with an equivalent
opportunity to that of the student/professional spouse.218 The Morgan
court's approach to devising a fair remedy was novel in its analysis of
equal treatment. Basically, the Morgan court had the right idea and
translated it into an available statutory remedy that proved unaccept-
able to an appellate court because it was framed in terms of alimony,
212. Id at 978, 81 Misc. 2d at 617.
213. Id at 982, 81 Misc. 2d at 621.
214. Id The husband was ordered to pay $200 a week in alimony and child support, so
long as his wife did not remarry and continued to be a full-time pre-medical or medical
student. Id Clearly, the remedy proposed in this article would carry no such restrictions or
limitations on the supporting spouse in terms of post-divorce life style or career pursuits.
215. Id at 981-82, 81 Misc. 2d at 621.
216. Morgan v. Morgan, 383 N.Y.S.2d 343, 344, 52 A.D.2d 804 (1976).
217. Id at 344, 52 A.D.2d at 804 (emphasis added). The court also added: "[W]hile this
Court recognized plaintifi's goal in medicine, this pursuit was never in the contemplation of
the parties during marriage and appears to be of recent origin." Id Again, the remedy pro-
posed ii this paper would not take such a consideration into account in recompensing the
supporting spouse.
218. See also Mori v. Mori, 124 Ariz. 193, 196, 603 P.2d 85, 87-88 (1979) (wife entitled to
three years rehabilitative maintenance to pursue higher education and seek employment
after twenty-five year marriage to lawyer); In re Marriage of Bowman, 633 P.2d 1198, 1202
(Mont. 1981) (wife of physician must be given opportunity to not only pursue a bachelor's
degree but also post-graduate education to secure appropriate employment to maintain high
standard of living); Childers v. Childers, 15 Wash. App. 792, 796, 552 P.2d 83, 85-86 (1976),
modrfed, 89 Wash. 2d 592, 575 P.2d 201 (1978) (husband ordered to support wife while she
earned undergraduate college degree; she supported him through medical internship).
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rather than as a property settlement. In a sense, the Morgan decision
was ahead of its time. Importantly, the appellate court did not reject
the theory of the award; it merely rejected the trial court's attempt to
fashion its remedy within the bounds of New York's statutory
provisions.
The times now, however, seem ripe for this equal opportunity ap-
proach to recompensing supporting spouses in educational-degree
cases. Simply by recognizing that an educational degree is a marital
property asset, and valuing the asset in terms of its labor input, courts
will be able to treat fairly both spouses at dissolution. Courts utilizing
this approach will be able to help the supporting spouse realize a return
on investment, as well as the opportunity for self development in
whatever manner he or she chooses. And the degree holder, while rec-
ompensing his or her partner for the fair value of the degree, will also
be free to pursue his or her career interests.
V. CONCLUSION
Educational degree cases present courts with difficult problems in-
volving fair valuation and distribution at divorce. These troubling
complexities can be avoided once courts recognize that an educational
degree or license to practice is a marital asset. Further, courts should
stop trying to evaluate educational degrees in monetary terms; both the
cost value methods and the future earnings calculations are problem-
atic, flawed, and ultimately unfair. The most equitable method of val-
uing a degree is in terms of the labor time utilized by the student
spouse to achieve the degree. The labor theory of value offers courts a
simple and economically sound approach to assessing the worth of this
asset. The supporting spouse, under this view, would be entitled to
one-half the value of the asset. In real terms, this would mean that the
supporting spouse would receive one-half of the other spouse's income,
for a number of years equivalent to those needed to acquire the degree
or license. This equal opportunity approach, grounded in a labor the-
ory of value, satisfies the dual needs of the courts in these cases; it pro-
vides an uncomplicated remedy that is both workable and equitable.
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